WordPress Core wp2shell REST batch route-confusion and SQL Injection Vulnerability Webapp Exploit

This module uses a chain of a REST batch route-confusion combined with a SQL injection vulnerability to deploy a network agent in WordPress Core that will run with the same user privileges than the affected software. The module will use the vulnerability chain and perform the following steps: * Check if the target is vulnerable. If it's not, the attack will stop. * Query the current number of wp_posts rows whose type is oembed_cache. This is saved so cleanup can later verify the run restored the cache count. * Create a random run_token, choose a high fake source_id, and build three unique embed URLs labeled outer, changeset, and dispatch. These are used to create traceable oEmbed cache rows for this run. * Build WordPress [embed]...[/embed] content containing those three URLs, then call union_posts(...) with a forged post row. Afterward, it will query the newest three oembed_cache row IDs and store them as outer_id, changeset_id, and dispatch_id. * Build a customize_changeset JSON payload, use the given administrator credentials (or generate random ones), and construct several fake wp_posts rows: an oEmbed cache row, a changeset row, a draft page, a request/dispatch row, a source post, and a trigger post. * Attempt to replay a privileged WordPress request using the crafted rows (via union_posts(rows, admin_body)) and create the temporary administrator account. It verifies creation either from the response or by counting matching wp_users rows. * Login as the temporary administrator, grab a REST nonce from the dashboard, create a unique plugin slug and secret web token, then call upload_and_activate(...). That helper creates a ZIP containing a temporary PHP plugin, uploads it through the WordPress plugin installer, finds the activation link, and activates it. * Send the necessary OS commands to deploy a CORE Impact agent to the temporary HTTP command endpoint via the run_command(...) function. * Call the plugin's cleanup endpoint using the secret token. The PHP plugin deletes the oEmbed/cache post IDs saved earlier. The script checks for WP2SHELL_CACHE_CLEANUP_COMPLETE. * Builds the REST API plugin path, mark the plugin inactive, then delete it through /wp-json/wp/v2/plugins/ endpoint. The REST response is checked against "deleted": true. * Identifies the current logged-in user, deletes that user with reassignment to user 1, then will check: the temporary username no longer exists, the plugin is no longer referenced in active_plugins, the final oEmbed cache count matches the baseline and the site root still returns HTTP 200.