CVE-2026-9198 is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability chain in Langflow OSS when AUTO_LOGIN is enabled. An unauthenticated network attacker can exploit CVE-2026-9103 to obtain a superuser access token from /api/v1/auto_login without credentials, then leverage CVE-2026-8481 in /api/v1/validate/code to execute user-controlled Python through exec(). By chaining these vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-9198 allows arbitrary command execution on the Langflow server. Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0, inclusive, are vulnerable. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.10.1. The module performs the following steps: 1. Uses the selected web page URL to identify the Langflow scheme, host, port, and base path. 2. Requests an access token without credentials from /api/v1/auto_login. 3. Queries /api/v1/users/whoami and requires the returned user to have is_superuser set to true, confirming CVE-2026-9103. 4. Queries the superuser-protected /api/v1/users/?limit=1 endpoint and requires an HTTP 200 response as a second privilege check. 5. Submits a crafted Python function decorator to /api/v1/validate/code. The decorator executes immediately through exec(), and the module recovers command output from function.errors. 6. Executes the whoami command, recovers its output, and identifies the operating system reported by the vulnerable Langflow Python process, confirming CVE-2026-8481 and the complete CVE-2026-9198 chain. 7. When DEPLOY OSCI AGENT is enabled, the module commits a non-blind OSCI agent associated with CVE-2026-9198 that reuses the same Langflow primitive to relaunch commands later without copying an Impact executable to the target. 8. Stores the Langflow connection parameters required to request a fresh AUTO_LOGIN token whenever the OSCI agent executes a command. 9. Relaunches commands through /api/v1/validate/code and returns their standard output and exit status to the Impact console. 10. When DEPLOY NETWORK AGENT is enabled, the module stages an Impact payload from the embedded web server and launches it through the vulnerable Langflow service. 11. Waits for the native agent connection, associates a successful deployment with CVE-2026-9198, and performs the cleanup required by the selected deployment method. The executed commands and any deployed agent will run with the privileges of the Langflow service account.

CVE-2026-9198 is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability chain in Langflow OSS when AUTO_LOGIN is enabled. An unauthenticated network attacker can exploit CVE-2026-9103 to obtain a superuser access token from /api/v1/auto_login without credentials, then leverage CVE-2026-8481 in /api/v1/validate/code to execute user-controlled Python through exec(). By chaining these vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-9198 allows arbitrary command execution on the Langflow server. Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0, inclusive, are vulnerable. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.10.1. The module performs the following steps: 1. Determines whether the Langflow service uses plain HTTP or HTTPS. 2. Requests an access token without credentials from /api/v1/auto_login. 3. Queries /api/v1/users/whoami and requires the returned user to have is_superuser set to true, confirming CVE-2026-9103. 4. Queries the superuser-protected /api/v1/users/?limit=1 endpoint and requires an HTTP 200 response as a second privilege check. 5. Submits a crafted Python function decorator to /api/v1/validate/code. The decorator executes immediately through exec(), and the module recovers command output from function.errors. 6. Executes the whoami command, recovers its output, and identifies the operating system reported by the vulnerable Langflow Python process, confirming CVE-2026-8481 and the complete CVE-2026-9198 chain. 7. When DEPLOY OSCI AGENT is enabled, the module commits a non-blind OSCI agent associated with CVE-2026-9198 that reuses the same Langflow primitive to relaunch commands later without copying a Core Impact executable agent into the target. 8. Stores the Langflow connection parameters required to request a fresh AUTO_LOGIN token whenever the OSCI agent executes a command. 9. Relaunches commands through /api/v1/validate/code and returns their standard output and exit status to the Impact console. 10. When DEPLOY NETWORK AGENT is enabled, the module stages an Impact payload from the embedded web server and launches it through the vulnerable Langflow service. 11. Waits for the native agent connection, associates a successful deployment with CVE-2026-9198, and performs the cleanup required by the selected deployment method. The executed commands and any deployed agent will run with the privileges of the Langflow service account.

This module exploits CVE-2026-53365, to elevate privileges on a Linux target. The vulnerability is a page-reference-count underflow in the Linux kernel io_uring zero-copy send path over AF_VSOCK. It can free a page that remains pinned and allow the page to be reclaimed as privileged file page-cache data. The exploit uses the vulnerability to modify the interpreter path in the page-cache contents of "/usr/bin/su" and execute a caller-supplied ELF with root privileges. The module uploads the exploit binary and a generated Core Impact agent ELF with random names to the directory selected by the TMP_DIR parameter. After successful exploitation, its setuid helper executes that agent with root privileges. Before exploitation, the module refuses to continue if the cached "/usr/bin/su" image already references the exploit interpreter and removes stale files from previous failed attempts. After the privileged interpreter has executed, the exploit restores the original cached "/usr/bin/su" ELF page through its fixed-buffer alias before tearing down the io_uring worker. After the new agent connects, the module waits for a privileged filesystem-cache eviction, verifies that the cached "/usr/bin/su" image no longer references the exploit interpreter, and removes the uploaded files and fixed-name exploit artifacts. Even after successful restoration, another exploitation attempt requires a reboot because the affected page and allocator state are not reusable during the same boot.

This module exploits CVE-2026-63077, a pre-authentication unsafe XML deserialization vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises. It registers a synthetic build agent through the agent polling protocol and submits a crafted XML document using the resulting agent session, without requiring TeamCity user credentials. Deserialization of the payload initializes an in-memory HSQLDB data source and uses HSQLDB's SCRIPT functionality to write a temporary JSP payload into the TeamCity ROOT web application. The module requests this JSP to execute an operating-system command as the account running the TeamCity server service. The JSP captures combined standard output and standard error, deletes itself when invoked, and is guarded against repeated execution. The module can verify the vulnerability, identify Linux or Windows targets, execute commands, and deploy an encrypted OSCI agent. It supports HTTP and HTTPS targets, including IPv6 addresses. Agent deployment is implemented for x86-64 Linux and Windows systems. Each command requires three HTTP requests: synthetic-agent registration, delivery of the deserialization payload, and invocation of the generated JSP. Commands are limited to 2026 characters, execution is limited to approximately 10 seconds, and captured output is limited to 1 MiB. Commands are executed with the privileges of the TeamCity server process. The exploit was tested against TeamCity 2025.11.6 on Ubuntu Linux 26.04 LTS and Windows Server 2025 Datacenter. Other vulnerable versions or platforms may also be affected but have not been verified by the engineering team.

This module exploits CVE-2026-63077, a pre-authentication unsafe XML deserialization vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises. It registers a synthetic build agent through the agent polling protocol and submits a crafted XML document using the resulting agent session, without requiring TeamCity user credentials. Deserialization of the payload initializes an in-memory HSQLDB data source and uses HSQLDB's SCRIPT functionality to write a temporary JSP payload into the TeamCity ROOT web application. The module requests this JSP to execute an operating-system command as the account running the TeamCity server service. The JSP captures combined standard output and standard error, deletes itself when invoked, and is guarded against repeated execution. The module can verify the vulnerability, identify Linux or Windows targets, execute commands, and deploy an encrypted OSCI agent. It supports HTTP and HTTPS targets, including IPv6 addresses. Agent deployment is implemented for x86-64 Linux and Windows systems. Each command requires three HTTP requests: synthetic-agent registration, delivery of the deserialization payload, and invocation of the generated JSP. Commands are limited to 2026 characters, execution is limited to approximately 10 seconds, and captured output is limited to 1 MiB. Commands are executed with the privileges of the TeamCity server process. The exploit was tested against TeamCity 2025.11.6 on Ubuntu Linux 26.04 LTS and Windows Server 2025 Datacenter. Other vulnerable versions or platforms may also be affected but have not been verified by the engineering team.

This module uses a pre-authentication access-control bypass in the API of Fortinet FortiClient EMS. The module will use the vulnerability by impersonating the trusted component that normally reports a successfully verified client TLS certificate. The module will check if the target is vulnerable to the authentication bypass by sending crafted HTTP requests to the /api/v1/system/capabilities endpoint. If the target is vulnerable, the module will log and output the value returned by the /api/v1/system/version endpoint.

This module uses a pre-authentication access-control bypass in the API of Fortinet FortiClient EMS. The module will use the vulnerability by impersonating the trusted component that normally reports a successfully verified client TLS certificate. The module will check if the target is vulnerable to the authentication bypass by sending crafted HTTP requests to the /api/v1/system/capabilities endpoint. If the target is vulnerable, the module will log and output the value returned by the /api/v1/system/version endpoint.

This module uses a chain of a REST batch route-confusion combined with a SQL injection vulnerability to deploy a network agent in WordPress Core that will run with the same user privileges than the affected software. The module will use the vulnerability chain and perform the following steps: * Check if the target is vulnerable. If it's not, the attack will stop. * Query the current number of wp_posts rows whose type is oembed_cache. This is saved so cleanup can later verify the run restored the cache count. * Create a random run_token, choose a high fake source_id, and build three unique embed URLs labeled outer, changeset, and dispatch. These are used to create traceable oEmbed cache rows for this run. * Build WordPress [embed]...[/embed] content containing those three URLs, then call union_posts(...) with a forged post row. Afterward, it will query the newest three oembed_cache row IDs and store them as outer_id, changeset_id, and dispatch_id. * Build a customize_changeset JSON payload, use the given administrator credentials (or generate random ones), and construct several fake wp_posts rows: an oEmbed cache row, a changeset row, a draft page, a request/dispatch row, a source post, and a trigger post. * Attempt to replay a privileged WordPress request using the crafted rows (via union_posts(rows, admin_body)) and create the temporary administrator account. It verifies creation either from the response or by counting matching wp_users rows. * Login as the temporary administrator, grab a REST nonce from the dashboard, create a unique plugin slug and secret web token, then call upload_and_activate(...). That helper creates a ZIP containing a temporary PHP plugin, uploads it through the WordPress plugin installer, finds the activation link, and activates it. * Send the necessary OS commands to deploy a CORE Impact agent to the temporary HTTP command endpoint via the run_command(...) function. * Call the plugin's cleanup endpoint using the secret token. The PHP plugin deletes the oEmbed/cache post IDs saved earlier. The script checks for WP2SHELL_CACHE_CLEANUP_COMPLETE. * Builds the REST API plugin path, mark the plugin inactive, then delete it through /wp-json/wp/v2/plugins/ endpoint. The REST response is checked against "deleted": true. * Identifies the current logged-in user, deletes that user with reassignment to user 1, then will check: the temporary username no longer exists, the plugin is no longer referenced in active_plugins, the final oEmbed cache count matches the baseline and the site root still returns HTTP 200.

This module uses a chain of a REST batch route-confusion combined with a SQL injection vulnerability to deploy a network agent in WordPress Core that will run with the same user privileges than the affected software. The module will use the vulnerability chain and perform the following steps: * Check if the target is vulnerable. If it's not, the attack will stop. * Query the current number of wp_posts rows whose type is oembed_cache. This is saved so cleanup can later verify the run restored the cache count. * Create a random run_token, choose a high fake source_id, and build three unique embed URLs labeled outer, changeset, and dispatch. These are used to create traceable oEmbed cache rows for this run. * Build WordPress [embed]...[/embed] content containing those three URLs, then call union_posts(...) with a forged post row. Afterward, it will query the newest three oembed_cache row IDs and store them as outer_id, changeset_id, and dispatch_id. * Build a customize_changeset JSON payload, use the given administrator credentials (or generate random ones), and construct several fake wp_posts rows: an oEmbed cache row, a changeset row, a draft page, a request/dispatch row, a source post, and a trigger post. * Attempt to replay a privileged WordPress request using the crafted rows (via union_posts(rows, admin_body)) and create the temporary administrator account. It verifies creation either from the response or by counting matching wp_users rows. * Login as the temporary administrator, grab a REST nonce from the dashboard, create a unique plugin slug and secret web token, then call upload_and_activate(...). That helper creates a ZIP containing a temporary PHP plugin, uploads it through the WordPress plugin installer, finds the activation link, and activates it. * Send the necessary OS commands to deploy a CORE Impact agent to the temporary HTTP command endpoint via the run_command(...) function. * Call the plugin's cleanup endpoint using the secret token. The PHP plugin deletes the oEmbed/cache post IDs saved earlier. The script checks for WP2SHELL_CACHE_CLEANUP_COMPLETE. * Builds the REST API plugin path, mark the plugin inactive, then delete it through /wp-json/wp/v2/plugins/ endpoint. The REST response is checked against "deleted": true. * Identifies the current logged-in user, deletes that user with reassignment to user 1, then will check: the temporary username no longer exists, the plugin is no longer referenced in active_plugins, the final oEmbed cache count matches the baseline and the site root still returns HTTP 200.

This module exploits CVE-2026-4480, an unauthenticated remote command injection vulnerability in the Samba printing subsystem. Samba passes the client-controlled print-job description to the configured "print command" through the %J substitution without escaping shell metacharacters, allowing commands to be executed remotely. The vulnerable application is a Samba print server. Affected versions are Samba 4.22.9 and earlier, 4.23.0 through 4.23.7, and 4.24.0 through 4.24.2. Exploitation requires an accessible printer share whose "print command" contains %J. This module performs the following steps: Connects to the target SMB service and binds to the spoolss named pipe using MS-RPRN. Enumerates advertised printer shares and automatically selects the first print queue, or uses the printer name supplied in Manual mode. Generates the commands required to transfer and launch a Linux x86-64 Core Impact agent. Encodes each command in Base64 and places the decoding pipeline in the client-controlled print-job description that Samba expands as %J. Submits a non-empty RAW print job and completes it to trigger the vulnerable server-side "print command". Executes the generated commands in the Samba print-processing security context and deploys the Core Impact agent.