This module chains 2 vulnerabilities to deploy an agent in the target system that will run with NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM user privileges. The first vulnerability is an authentication bypass present in the doLogin function of the com.ca.arcserve.edge.app.base.ui.server.EdgeLoginServiceImpl class. The second vulnerability is an authenticated path traversal file upload present in the doPost method of the com.ca.arcserve.edge.app.base.ui.server.servlet.ImportNodeServlet class. This module will use the first vulnerability to authenticate against the target application using a POST HTTP request to the /management/wizardLogin endpoint, providing a random username and no password parameter. Then, it will use the second vulnerability to upload a JSP file to the Program Files/Arcserve/Unified Data Protection/Management/TOMCAT/webapps/management directory. Finally, it will deploy an agent using a GET HTTP request to the uploaded JSP file inside the /management endpoint.
This module chains 2 vulnerabilities to deploy an agent in the target system that will run with NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM user privileges. The first vulnerability is an authentication bypass present in the doLogin function of the com.ca.arcserve.edge.app.base.ui.server.EdgeLoginServiceImpl class. The second vulnerability is an authenticated path traversal file upload present in the doPost method of the com.ca.arcserve.edge.app.base.ui.server.servlet.ImportNodeServlet class. This module will use the first vulnerability to authenticate against the target application using a POST HTTP request to the /management/wizardLogin endpoint, providing a random username and no password parameter. Then, it will use the second vulnerability to upload a JSP file to the Program Files/Arcserve/Unified Data Protection/Management/TOMCAT/webapps/management directory. Finally, it will deploy an agent using a GET HTTP request to the uploaded JSP file inside the /management endpoint.
The Windows NT operating system kernel executable (ntoskrnl.exe) present in Microsoft Windows is vulnerable to a race condition, which can result in arbitrary memory write. This module allows a local unprivileged user to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. The steps performed by the exploit are: Discover an exploit primitive Perform heap feng shui to come up with a memory layout Allocate enough "GOLD" objects using the GetUIDllName function Free some of them to create some holes using the FreeDiagInstance function Allocate a worker "GOLD" object to trigger the use-after-free vulnerability Delete the "RequestMakeCall" key value and create a REG_BINARY type key with controlled content. Then, I allocate some key value heaps to ensure they occupy the hole left by the worker object XFG mitigation
The Kernel Streaming WOW Thunk Service module (ksthunk.sys) present in Microsoft Windows is vulnerable to an out-of-bounds write, which can result in arbitrary memory write. This module allows a local unprivileged user to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. The steps performed by the exploit are: Spray the memory with data queue entries Trigger the OOB write to overwrite the victim entry Leak adjacent pool memory and bypass KASLR Forge a data queue entry to get an arbitrary memory read Leak the address of the current process token Leak the address of the SYSTEM process token Create a new data queue entry and leak its IRP Forge an IRP and the data queue entry Read 1 byte to trigger the arbitrary write and get SYSTEM privileges
In GeoServer prior to versions 2.23.6, 2.24.4, and 2.25.2, multiple OGC request parameters allow Remote Code Execution (RCE) by unauthenticated users through specially crafted input against a default GeoServer installation due to unsafely evaluating property names as XPath expressions. The GeoTools library API that GeoServer calls evaluates property/attribute names for feature types in a way that unsafely passes them to the commons-jxpath library which can execute arbitrary code when evaluating XPath expressions. This XPath evaluation is intended to be used only by complex feature types (i.e., Application Schema data stores) but is incorrectly being applied to simple feature types as well which makes this vulnerability apply to all GeoServer instances. In order to exploit this vulnerability, this module sends an evil XPath expression that after being processed by the commons-jxpath library allows us to deploy an agent.
In GeoServer prior to versions 2.23.6, 2.24.4, and 2.25.2, multiple OGC request parameters allow Remote Code Execution (RCE) by unauthenticated users through specially crafted input against a default GeoServer installation due to unsafely evaluating property names as XPath expressions. The GeoTools library API that GeoServer calls evaluates property/attribute names for feature types in a way that unsafely passes them to the commons-jxpath library which can execute arbitrary code when evaluating XPath expressions. This XPath evaluation is intended to be used only by complex feature types (i.e., Application Schema data stores) but is incorrectly being applied to simple feature types as well which makes this vulnerability apply to all GeoServer instances. In order to exploit this vulnerability, this module sends an evil XPath expression that after being processed by the commons-jxpath library allows us to deploy an agent.
This tool bypasses Mark of the Web and Smart Screen in order to execute blocked files which usually have been downloaded from internet. It involves crafting LNK files that have non-standard target paths or internal structures. When clicked, these LNK files are modified by explorer.exe with the canonical formatting. This modification leads to removal of the MotW label before security checks are performed, this results in the execution of the locked file bypassing the warnings.
This module uses a .NET deserialization vulnerability to deploy an agent in Veeam Backup and Replication that will run with the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM user privileges. First, the module will register an endpoint in the local webserver that will be used in the attack to send a serialized gadget to the target that will execute system commands to deploy the agent. Finally, it will trigger the vulnerability by crafting a System.Runtime.Remoting.ObjRef .NET class type object and sending it to the /VeeamAuthService .NET remoting endpoint using an external .NET executable. The deserialization of the crafted object will force a POST HTTP request to the local webserver, which will, in turn, deliver the serialized gadget that will deploy the agent.
This exploit leverages an Information Disclosure vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook. By sending a mail crafting a malicious path and using the "img src" tag, an attacker can coerce authentication to an untrusted server and steal NTLM hashes. The link points to an SMB server. When the client opens Outlook, if the user is on the trusted list, without clicking, it connects to the SMB server and obtains the NTLM user hashes. In case the user is not on the trusted user list, in order to exploit the vulnerability, the client must click on the attached link. This exploit does not install an agent, it manages to obtain the NTML hash of a legitimate user. It is possible to use tools like "John the Ripper" to attempt decrypting the original password associated with the hash.
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