Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce can accept a dangerous filename through guest-cart custom option file metadata while validating the supplied bytes as an image. A GIF/PHP polyglot can therefore be persisted with a PHP extension under the custom option media area. The module discovers the active store code through GraphQL. When the catalog exposes exactly one in-stock product, it resolves the SKU automatically; catalogs with multiple candidates require the optional advanced SKU override. The vulnerable endpoint accepts the file metadata with an arbitrary numeric option identifier, which the module supplies internally. Upload acceptance is intermediate evidence only. The module proves PHP interpretation and operating-system command execution before committing an OSCI agent. Each OSCI command uses a new random, token-guarded GIF/PHP polyglot which deletes itself before running the requested command. Optional native Network-agent delivery uses curl and verifies the exit status of every installer command. The Network agent option is disabled by default. Execution depends on a web-server route that sends uploaded PHP files to PHP-FPM. A blocked media route is an execution-route precondition failure and does not prove that the unrestricted upload is patched. The OSCI agent runs commands with the privileges of the PHP service account and is not expected to be a superuser.

Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce can accept a dangerous filename through guest-cart custom option file metadata while validating the supplied bytes as an image. A GIF/PHP polyglot can therefore be persisted with a PHP extension under the custom option media area. The module discovers the active store code through GraphQL. When the catalog exposes exactly one in-stock product, it also resolves the SKU automatically; catalogs with multiple candidates require the optional advanced SKU override. The vulnerable endpoint processes file metadata for an arbitrary numeric option identifier, so the module supplies an internal identifier and does not require an operator option value. The module tries the canonical Magento media routes /media and /pub/media. It proceeds only when the marker produces a dynamic PHP version and process identifier without returning PHP source. This execution condition depends on the web-server configuration; a blocked media route is not treated as proof that the upload primitive is patched. After confirming PHP interpretation and operating-system command execution, the module commits an OSCI agent. Every OSCI command is embedded in a new request-specific, token-guarded GIF/PHP polyglot that deletes itself before executing. Optional native Network-agent delivery uses curl and verifies the exit status of every installer command. By default no native Network agent is installed. The vendor CVSS vector describes user interaction. This module implements the separately published unauthenticated guest-cart laboratory path and should be used only where that endpoint and its product-option prerequisites are independently confirmed.

This module exploits CVE-2026-75650, a critical unauthenticated template injection vulnerability in Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce known as StyleSmuggler. Improper neutralization of template-engine elements allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through the Magento storefront. The exploit performs the following actions: Sends a crafted request to the Payflow transparent-response endpoint to create a Magento error report containing a PHP command runner. Extracts the generated report identifier and resolves its location. A configured REPORT DIRECTORY override is tried first; otherwise, the module tests paths relative to the Magento front controller. Creates an unauthenticated guest cart and assigns a guest email address. Stores the StyleSmuggler Preview block payload in the guest billing address. Triggers the failed-payment GraphQL path with a crafted styles object graph that includes the poisoned report. Confirms operating-system command execution with a harmless marker and deploys the selected Impact agent. By default, the module commits an interactive OSCI agent that replays the complete StyleSmuggler chain for every command and returns standard output. A Linux x86-64 Network Agent can be deployed as an alternative through the standard download-and-execute flow, which tries curl, wget, and BusyBox wget in that order. Commands and agents run with the privileges of the Magento web-server process. No Magento credentials are required. The module supports HTTP and HTTPS services, including IPv6 targets. Adobe lists Adobe Commerce 2.4.4-2026-aug through 2.4.9-2026-aug and earlier releases in those version lines, Adobe Commerce B2B 1.3.3-2026-aug through 1.5.3-2026-aug and earlier releases in those version lines, and Magento Open Source 2.4.6-2026-aug through 2.4.9-2026-aug and earlier releases in those version lines as affected.

This module exploits CVE-2026-75650, a critical unauthenticated template injection vulnerability in Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce known as StyleSmuggler. Improper neutralization of template-engine elements allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through the Magento storefront. The exploit performs the following actions: Sends a crafted request to the Payflow transparent-response endpoint to create a Magento error report containing a PHP command runner. Extracts the generated report identifier and resolves its location. A configured REPORT DIRECTORY override is tried first; otherwise, the module tests paths relative to the Magento front controller. Creates an unauthenticated guest cart and assigns a guest email address. Stores the StyleSmuggler Preview block payload in the guest billing address. Triggers the failed-payment GraphQL path with a crafted styles object graph that includes the poisoned report. Confirms operating-system command execution with a harmless marker and deploys the selected Impact agent. By default, the module commits an interactive OSCI agent that replays the complete StyleSmuggler chain for every command and returns standard output. A Linux x86-64 Network Agent can be deployed as an alternative through the standard download-and-execute flow, which tries curl, wget, and BusyBox wget in that order. Commands and agents run with the privileges of the Magento web-server process. No Magento credentials are required. The target webpage supplies the HTTP or HTTPS scheme, host, port, and Magento installation path. Adobe lists Adobe Commerce 2.4.4-2026-aug through 2.4.9-2026-aug and earlier releases in those version lines, Adobe Commerce B2B 1.3.3-2026-aug through 1.5.3-2026-aug and earlier releases in those version lines, and Magento Open Source 2.4.6-2026-aug through 2.4.9-2026-aug and earlier releases in those version lines as affected.

CVE-2026-9198 is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability chain in Langflow OSS when AUTO_LOGIN is enabled. An unauthenticated network attacker can exploit CVE-2026-9103 to obtain a superuser access token from /api/v1/auto_login without credentials, then leverage CVE-2026-8481 in /api/v1/validate/code to execute user-controlled Python through exec(). By chaining these vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-9198 allows arbitrary command execution on the Langflow server. Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0, inclusive, are vulnerable. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.10.1. The module performs the following steps: 1. Uses the selected web page URL to identify the Langflow scheme, host, port, and base path. 2. Requests an access token without credentials from /api/v1/auto_login. 3. Queries /api/v1/users/whoami and requires the returned user to have is_superuser set to true, confirming CVE-2026-9103. 4. Queries the superuser-protected /api/v1/users/?limit=1 endpoint and requires an HTTP 200 response as a second privilege check. 5. Submits a crafted Python function decorator to /api/v1/validate/code. The decorator executes immediately through exec(), and the module recovers command output from function.errors. 6. Executes the whoami command, recovers its output, and identifies the operating system reported by the vulnerable Langflow Python process, confirming CVE-2026-8481 and the complete CVE-2026-9198 chain. 7. When DEPLOY OSCI AGENT is enabled, the module commits a non-blind OSCI agent associated with CVE-2026-9198 that reuses the same Langflow primitive to relaunch commands later without copying an Impact executable to the target. 8. Stores the Langflow connection parameters required to request a fresh AUTO_LOGIN token whenever the OSCI agent executes a command. 9. Relaunches commands through /api/v1/validate/code and returns their standard output and exit status to the Impact console. 10. When DEPLOY NETWORK AGENT is enabled, the module stages an Impact payload from the embedded web server and launches it through the vulnerable Langflow service. 11. Waits for the native agent connection, associates a successful deployment with CVE-2026-9198, and performs the cleanup required by the selected deployment method. The executed commands and any deployed agent will run with the privileges of the Langflow service account.

The module authenticates to Configuration Manager AdminService with a low-privileged domain identity and calls UploadExtensionInChunks. The exploit uses an Authenticode-signed CAB to extract a path traversal to place an adsource.dll proxy and a preserved original DLL in the Configuration Manager bin X64 directory. Active Directory System Discovery subsequently loads the proxy in SMS_EXECUTIVE and modifies the built-in RID-500 account as NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The module then authenticates over SMB with that local administrator and deploys an Impact agent as SYSTEM. An HTTP 500 response can occur after successful CAB extraction and is therefore not treated as definitive failure. The agent callback is the success condition.

This module uses a chain of a REST batch route-confusion combined with a SQL injection vulnerability to deploy a network agent in WordPress Core that will run with the same user privileges than the affected software. The module will use the vulnerability chain and perform the following steps: * Check if the target is vulnerable. If it's not, the attack will stop. * Query the current number of wp_posts rows whose type is oembed_cache. This is saved so cleanup can later verify the run restored the cache count. * Create a random run_token, choose a high fake source_id, and build three unique embed URLs labeled outer, changeset, and dispatch. These are used to create traceable oEmbed cache rows for this run. * Build WordPress [embed]...[/embed] content containing those three URLs, then call union_posts(...) with a forged post row. Afterward, it will query the newest three oembed_cache row IDs and store them as outer_id, changeset_id, and dispatch_id. * Build a customize_changeset JSON payload, use the given administrator credentials (or generate random ones), and construct several fake wp_posts rows: an oEmbed cache row, a changeset row, a draft page, a request/dispatch row, a source post, and a trigger post. * Attempt to replay a privileged WordPress request using the crafted rows (via union_posts(rows, admin_body)) and create the temporary administrator account. It verifies creation either from the response or by counting matching wp_users rows. * Login as the temporary administrator, grab a REST nonce from the dashboard, create a unique plugin slug and secret web token, then call upload_and_activate(...). That helper creates a ZIP containing a temporary PHP plugin, uploads it through the WordPress plugin installer, finds the activation link, and activates it. * Send the necessary OS commands to deploy a CORE Impact agent to the temporary HTTP command endpoint via the run_command(...) function. * Call the plugin's cleanup endpoint using the secret token. The PHP plugin deletes the oEmbed/cache post IDs saved earlier. The script checks for WP2SHELL_CACHE_CLEANUP_COMPLETE. * Builds the REST API plugin path, mark the plugin inactive, then delete it through /wp-json/wp/v2/plugins/ endpoint. The REST response is checked against "deleted": true. * Identifies the current logged-in user, deletes that user with reassignment to user 1, then will check: the temporary username no longer exists, the plugin is no longer referenced in active_plugins, the final oEmbed cache count matches the baseline and the site root still returns HTTP 200.

This module uses a .NET deserialization vulnerability to deploy a network agent in Veeam Backup and Replication MountService that will run with the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM user privileges. First, the module will register an endpoint in the local webserver that will be used in the attack to send a serialized gadget to the target that will execute system commands to deploy the agent. Finally, it will trigger the vulnerability by crafting a System.Runtime.Remoting.ObjRef .NET class type object and sending it to the /PermanentSessionService .NET remoting endpoint using an external .NET executable. The deserialization of the crafted object will force a POST HTTP request to the registered endpoint in the local webserver, which will, in turn, deliver the serialized gadget that will deploy the agent.

ProFTPD mod_sql contains an SQL escaping bypass in the SQLLog formatting pipeline. Values that start and end with a single quote and contain no internal single quotes can be treated as already escaped. When a vulnerable SQLNamedQuery wraps attacker-controlled variables such as %U in single quotes, an unauthenticated FTP USER value can break out of the logging INSERT and inject stacked SQL statements. This module targets vulnerable ProFTPD 1.3.0 through 1.3.9 deployments using mod_sql with mod_sql_postgres and a vulnerable SQLLog / SQLNamedQuery configuration. This module uses the pre-auth USER trigger commonly exposed by SQLLog ERR_* and executes operating system commands on the PostgreSQL host through COPY TO PROGRAM. Commands are base64 encoded before injection so the FTP USER payload contains no internal single quotes and satisfies the vulnerable is_escaped_text() heuristic. The exploit first resolves the target FTP service from the selected host and service metadata, configures a curl-based agent download method, and checks that the FTP banner is reachable. It then generates a short command sequence to download, chmod, and execute the agent from the PostgreSQL host. Each command is wrapped in a base64-decoding shell launcher, embedded into a stacked SQL COPY TO PROGRAM payload, and sent through an unauthenticated FTP USER command. After sending the payload sequence, the module waits for the deployed agent connection and reports the final remote code execution result. The attack requires the ProFTPD database role to be able to execute PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM, and curl must be available on the PostgreSQL host for the connection types (HTTPS Channel and Connect From connection) for the agent download. The deployed agent will run with the privileges of the PostgreSQL server process.

In a network-exposed cupsd with a shared target queue, an unauthorized client can send a Print-Job to that shared PostScript queue without authentication. In CUPS, the server accepts a page-border value supplied as textWithoutLanguage, preserves an embedded newline through option escaping and reparse, and then reparses the resulting second-line "PPD:" text as a trusted scheduler control record. A follow-up raw print job can therefore make the server execute an attacker-chosen existing binary with with lp user privileges. This module will first get the list of the shared printers of the target. Then, it will register an endpoint in the local webserver for future files exfiltrations. Later, it will use the vulnerability against each shared printer to exfiltrate the /etc/os-release file. If the file is retrieved, then the target will be marked as vulnerable and the following printers will be skipped in the attack. Also, the ID field of the exfiltrated file will be used to identify the Linux distribution and decide the following step of the attack. If the Linux distribution is Arch, then the module will use the vulnerability again to deploy an agent in the target that will run with the cups user privileges. If the Linux distribution is any other, the module will use the vulnerability again to exfiltrate the /etc/passwd file. This is due the fact that in any other Linux distribution CUPS's sub-processes are isolated and monitored by AppArmor or SELinux.