CVE-2026-48908 affects JoomShaper SP Page Builder versions 6.6.1 and earlier. The asset.uploadCustomIcon task accepts an icon-font ZIP without authentication or a CSRF token. The module sends a valid multipart icon-font package in the custom_icon field. The vulnerable component extracts the archive below media/com_sppagebuilder/assets/iconfont/name/, a location normally served by the Joomla web server. The archive contains a randomly named, token-guarded PHP file in the fonts directory. The module first requests that file with a harmless marker to distinguish file write from server-side PHP execution. It then uses the same endpoint to deliver the selected Linux Impact agent. Successful execution depends on the target web server allowing PHP execution for the extracted media directory. If the upload succeeds but PHP is not executed there, the target is file-write vulnerable but is not confirmed as remote code execution by this module. The agent runs with the privileges of the Joomla/PHP service account, commonly www-data on Linux Apache deployments. No administrator credentials are required.

CVE-2026-48908 affects JoomShaper SP Page Builder versions 6.6.1 and earlier. The asset.uploadCustomIcon task accepts an icon-font ZIP without requiring authentication or a CSRF token. The module sends a valid multipart icon-font package in the custom_icon field. The vulnerable component extracts the archive below media/com_sppagebuilder/assets/iconfont/name/, a location normally served by the Joomla web server. The archive contains a randomly named, token-guarded PHP file in the fonts directory. The module first requests that file with a harmless marker to distinguish file write from server-side PHP execution. It then uses the same endpoint to deliver the selected Linux Impact agent. Successful execution depends on the target web server allowing PHP execution for the extracted media directory. If the upload succeeds but PHP is not executed there, the target is file-write vulnerable but is not confirmed as remote code execution by this module. The agent runs with the privileges of the Joomla/PHP service account, commonly www-data on Linux Apache deployments. No administrator credentials are required. Linux agent delivery uses curl because standard Joomla PHP/Apache images commonly include curl without wget. The selected Impact web server must be reachable from the target container.

This module exploits CVE-2026-81578, an improper access control vulnerability combined with CVE-2026-82078, an unsafe dynamic class loading vulnerability in the database connection utilities of PaperCut NG and MF to deploy an OSCI agent. The module will use the vulnerability chain via a crafted Apache Tapestry complex-direct request to invoke privileged ConfigEditor components through the public Home page. On version 26 of the affected software, the module reconfigures external user lookup to use an H2 JDBC URL whose initialization SQL evaluates Groovy code. On versions 24 and 25, it uses a bundled Derby procedure to write a temporary Groovy bootstrap class to the application classpath and then loads it as a database driver. Due to the way the vulnerability chain is exploited, the command output cannot be reliably in-band through the existing lookup response, so OSCI agent commands will be marked as blind, meaning that no command output will be returned.

ResetNightmare is an authorization flaw in the Microsoft Kerberos Change Password protocol. On an unpatched domain controller, an attacker who can write the userPrincipalName attribute of a controlled account can obtain a kadmin/changepw ticket whose client name identifies another account while its PAC identifies the controlled account. The module temporarily changes the controlled account's UPN to the target sAMAccountName, requests a kadmin/changepw ticket with an NT-ENTERPRISE client name, restores the original UPN, and uses the ticket in an RFC 3244 password-change exchange. The target credentials are verified and stored as an Impact identity by default. The controlled account can be an existing user or computer whose cleartext password is known and whose userPrincipalName can be modified.

This module exploits CVE-2026-63077, a pre-authentication unsafe XML deserialization vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises. It registers a synthetic build agent through the agent polling protocol and submits a crafted XML document using the resulting agent session, without requiring TeamCity user credentials. Deserialization of the payload initializes an in-memory HSQLDB data source and uses HSQLDB's SCRIPT functionality to write a temporary JSP payload into the TeamCity ROOT web application. The module requests this JSP to execute an operating-system command as the account running the TeamCity server service. The JSP captures combined standard output and standard error, deletes itself when invoked, and is guarded against repeated execution. The module can verify the vulnerability, identify Linux or Windows targets, execute commands, and deploy an encrypted OSCI agent. It supports HTTP and HTTPS targets, including IPv6 addresses. Agent deployment is implemented for x86-64 Linux and Windows systems. Each command requires three HTTP requests: synthetic-agent registration, delivery of the deserialization payload, and invocation of the generated JSP. Commands are limited to 2026 characters, execution is limited to approximately 10 seconds, and captured output is limited to 1 MiB. Commands are executed with the privileges of the TeamCity server process. The exploit was tested against TeamCity 2025.11.6 on Ubuntu Linux 26.04 LTS and Windows Server 2025 Datacenter. Other vulnerable versions or platforms may also be affected but have not been verified by the engineering team.

This module exploits CVE-2026-63077, a pre-authentication unsafe XML deserialization vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises. It registers a synthetic build agent through the agent polling protocol and submits a crafted XML document using the resulting agent session, without requiring TeamCity user credentials. Deserialization of the payload initializes an in-memory HSQLDB data source and uses HSQLDB's SCRIPT functionality to write a temporary JSP payload into the TeamCity ROOT web application. The module requests this JSP to execute an operating-system command as the account running the TeamCity server service. The JSP captures combined standard output and standard error, deletes itself when invoked, and is guarded against repeated execution. The module can verify the vulnerability, identify Linux or Windows targets, execute commands, and deploy an encrypted OSCI agent. It supports HTTP and HTTPS targets, including IPv6 addresses. Agent deployment is implemented for x86-64 Linux and Windows systems. Each command requires three HTTP requests: synthetic-agent registration, delivery of the deserialization payload, and invocation of the generated JSP. Commands are limited to 2026 characters, execution is limited to approximately 10 seconds, and captured output is limited to 1 MiB. Commands are executed with the privileges of the TeamCity server process. The exploit was tested against TeamCity 2025.11.6 on Ubuntu Linux 26.04 LTS and Windows Server 2025 Datacenter. Other vulnerable versions or platforms may also be affected but have not been verified by the engineering team.

This module exploits CVE-2025-37164, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in HPE OneView. The module first queries the appliance version endpoint, then validates the vulnerability by sending a benign command to the ID Pools executeCommand REST endpoint. If the target is vulnerable, commands are executed through the same endpoint to deploy an OSCI agent or a classic network agent. The vulnerable endpoint does not return command output, so the OSCI agent is committed as a blind command execution primitive.

This module uses a pre-authentication access-control bypass in the API of Fortinet FortiClient EMS. The module will use the vulnerability by impersonating the trusted component that normally reports a successfully verified client TLS certificate. The module will check if the target is vulnerable to the authentication bypass by sending crafted HTTP requests to the /api/v1/system/capabilities endpoint. If the target is vulnerable, the module will log and output the value returned by the /api/v1/system/version endpoint.

This module uses a pre-authentication access-control bypass in the API of Fortinet FortiClient EMS. The module will use the vulnerability by impersonating the trusted component that normally reports a successfully verified client TLS certificate. The module will check if the target is vulnerable to the authentication bypass by sending crafted HTTP requests to the /api/v1/system/capabilities endpoint. If the target is vulnerable, the module will log and output the value returned by the /api/v1/system/version endpoint.

This module uses a chain of a REST batch route-confusion combined with a SQL injection vulnerability to deploy a network agent in WordPress Core that will run with the same user privileges than the affected software. The module will use the vulnerability chain and perform the following steps: * Check if the target is vulnerable. If it's not, the attack will stop. * Query the current number of wp_posts rows whose type is oembed_cache. This is saved so cleanup can later verify the run restored the cache count. * Create a random run_token, choose a high fake source_id, and build three unique embed URLs labeled outer, changeset, and dispatch. These are used to create traceable oEmbed cache rows for this run. * Build WordPress [embed]...[/embed] content containing those three URLs, then call union_posts(...) with a forged post row. Afterward, it will query the newest three oembed_cache row IDs and store them as outer_id, changeset_id, and dispatch_id. * Build a customize_changeset JSON payload, use the given administrator credentials (or generate random ones), and construct several fake wp_posts rows: an oEmbed cache row, a changeset row, a draft page, a request/dispatch row, a source post, and a trigger post. * Attempt to replay a privileged WordPress request using the crafted rows (via union_posts(rows, admin_body)) and create the temporary administrator account. It verifies creation either from the response or by counting matching wp_users rows. * Login as the temporary administrator, grab a REST nonce from the dashboard, create a unique plugin slug and secret web token, then call upload_and_activate(...). That helper creates a ZIP containing a temporary PHP plugin, uploads it through the WordPress plugin installer, finds the activation link, and activates it. * Send the necessary OS commands to deploy a CORE Impact agent to the temporary HTTP command endpoint via the run_command(...) function. * Call the plugin's cleanup endpoint using the secret token. The PHP plugin deletes the oEmbed/cache post IDs saved earlier. The script checks for WP2SHELL_CACHE_CLEANUP_COMPLETE. * Builds the REST API plugin path, mark the plugin inactive, then delete it through /wp-json/wp/v2/plugins/ endpoint. The REST response is checked against "deleted": true. * Identifies the current logged-in user, deletes that user with reassignment to user 1, then will check: the temporary username no longer exists, the plugin is no longer referenced in active_plugins, the final oEmbed cache count matches the baseline and the site root still returns HTTP 200.