This module uses a chain of a REST batch route-confusion combined with a SQL injection vulnerability to deploy a network agent in WordPress Core that will run with the same user privileges than the affected software. The module will use the vulnerability chain and perform the following steps: * Check if the target is vulnerable. If it's not, the attack will stop. * Query the current number of wp_posts rows whose type is oembed_cache. This is saved so cleanup can later verify the run restored the cache count. * Create a random run_token, choose a high fake source_id, and build three unique embed URLs labeled outer, changeset, and dispatch. These are used to create traceable oEmbed cache rows for this run. * Build WordPress [embed]...[/embed] content containing those three URLs, then call union_posts(...) with a forged post row. Afterward, it will query the newest three oembed_cache row IDs and store them as outer_id, changeset_id, and dispatch_id. * Build a customize_changeset JSON payload, use the given administrator credentials (or generate random ones), and construct several fake wp_posts rows: an oEmbed cache row, a changeset row, a draft page, a request/dispatch row, a source post, and a trigger post. * Attempt to replay a privileged WordPress request using the crafted rows (via union_posts(rows, admin_body)) and create the temporary administrator account. It verifies creation either from the response or by counting matching wp_users rows. * Login as the temporary administrator, grab a REST nonce from the dashboard, create a unique plugin slug and secret web token, then call upload_and_activate(...). That helper creates a ZIP containing a temporary PHP plugin, uploads it through the WordPress plugin installer, finds the activation link, and activates it. * Send the necessary OS commands to deploy a CORE Impact agent to the temporary HTTP command endpoint via the run_command(...) function. * Call the plugin's cleanup endpoint using the secret token. The PHP plugin deletes the oEmbed/cache post IDs saved earlier. The script checks for WP2SHELL_CACHE_CLEANUP_COMPLETE. * Builds the REST API plugin path, mark the plugin inactive, then delete it through /wp-json/wp/v2/plugins/ endpoint. The REST response is checked against "deleted": true. * Identifies the current logged-in user, deletes that user with reassignment to user 1, then will check: the temporary username no longer exists, the plugin is no longer referenced in active_plugins, the final oEmbed cache count matches the baseline and the site root still returns HTTP 200.

This module uses a .NET deserialization vulnerability to deploy a network agent in Veeam Backup and Replication MountService that will run with the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM user privileges. First, the module will register an endpoint in the local webserver that will be used in the attack to send a serialized gadget to the target that will execute system commands to deploy the agent. Finally, it will trigger the vulnerability by crafting a System.Runtime.Remoting.ObjRef .NET class type object and sending it to the /PermanentSessionService .NET remoting endpoint using an external .NET executable. The deserialization of the crafted object will force a POST HTTP request to the registered endpoint in the local webserver, which will, in turn, deliver the serialized gadget that will deploy the agent.

ProFTPD mod_sql contains an SQL escaping bypass in the SQLLog formatting pipeline. Values that start and end with a single quote and contain no internal single quotes can be treated as already escaped. When a vulnerable SQLNamedQuery wraps attacker-controlled variables such as %U in single quotes, an unauthenticated FTP USER value can break out of the logging INSERT and inject stacked SQL statements. This module targets vulnerable ProFTPD 1.3.0 through 1.3.9 deployments using mod_sql with mod_sql_postgres and a vulnerable SQLLog / SQLNamedQuery configuration. This module uses the pre-auth USER trigger commonly exposed by SQLLog ERR_* and executes operating system commands on the PostgreSQL host through COPY TO PROGRAM. Commands are base64 encoded before injection so the FTP USER payload contains no internal single quotes and satisfies the vulnerable is_escaped_text() heuristic. The exploit first resolves the target FTP service from the selected host and service metadata, configures a curl-based agent download method, and checks that the FTP banner is reachable. It then generates a short command sequence to download, chmod, and execute the agent from the PostgreSQL host. Each command is wrapped in a base64-decoding shell launcher, embedded into a stacked SQL COPY TO PROGRAM payload, and sent through an unauthenticated FTP USER command. After sending the payload sequence, the module waits for the deployed agent connection and reports the final remote code execution result. The attack requires the ProFTPD database role to be able to execute PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM, and curl must be available on the PostgreSQL host for the connection types (HTTPS Channel and Connect From connection) for the agent download. The deployed agent will run with the privileges of the PostgreSQL server process.

In a network-exposed cupsd with a shared target queue, an unauthorized client can send a Print-Job to that shared PostScript queue without authentication. In CUPS, the server accepts a page-border value supplied as textWithoutLanguage, preserves an embedded newline through option escaping and reparse, and then reparses the resulting second-line "PPD:" text as a trusted scheduler control record. A follow-up raw print job can therefore make the server execute an attacker-chosen existing binary with with lp user privileges. This module will first get the list of the shared printers of the target. Then, it will register an endpoint in the local webserver for future files exfiltrations. Later, it will use the vulnerability against each shared printer to exfiltrate the /etc/os-release file. If the file is retrieved, then the target will be marked as vulnerable and the following printers will be skipped in the attack. Also, the ID field of the exfiltrated file will be used to identify the Linux distribution and decide the following step of the attack. If the Linux distribution is Arch, then the module will use the vulnerability again to deploy an agent in the target that will run with the cups user privileges. If the Linux distribution is any other, the module will use the vulnerability again to exfiltrate the /etc/passwd file. This is due the fact that in any other Linux distribution CUPS's sub-processes are isolated and monitored by AppArmor or SELinux.

This module abuses Jolokia access to invoke the ActiveMQ Broker MBean addNetworkConnector operation. The crafted connector uses the VM transport brokerConfig option to load a Spring XML document from the IMPACT web server. The XML instantiates java.lang.ProcessBuilder and executes the agent deployment command sequence. The exploitation process performs the following steps: Starts the IMPACT web server and registers a randomized Spring XML payload path. Checks that the target Jolokia endpoint is reachable with the configured credentials. Discovers the ActiveMQ broker name through Jolokia, or uses the configured broker name when provided. Builds a malicious network connector URI using vm:// and brokerConfig=xbean to reference the Spring XML payload hosted by IMPACT. Sends a Jolokia exec request to call addNetworkConnector(java.lang.String) on the ActiveMQ Broker MBean. Waits for the target to fetch the Spring XML payload and execute the generated agent deployment command sequence. The deployed agent will run with the same privileges as the Apache ActiveMQ service.

This module chains two vulnerabilities in n8n to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution. The module abuses a vulnerable unauthenticated form endpoint to read local files from the target system. That file read primitive is then used to recover the n8n home path, configuration data, and encryption key material. The module then reads the n8n SQLite database to extract administrator account data from the application datastore. With that information, it forges an authenticated administrator token and creates a malicious workflow through the n8n API. Finally, the crafted workflow is used to execute operating system commands and deploy an agent on the target. The deployed agent will run with the privileges of the n8n service account.

The vulnerability exists within the GetCookie() endpoint due to unsafe deserialization of AuthorizationCookie objects. The application insecurely decrypts cookie data using AES-128-CBC and subsequently deserializes it via BinaryFormatter without sufficient type validation. The deployed agent will run with SYSTEM privileges. This exploit performs the following steps: Retrieves the ServerID via a SOAP request to the ReportingWebService. Obtains an authorization cookie. Obtains a reporting cookie. Constructs and sends a malicious event payload. Checks the server's response to confirm success

This module exploits a nested PHP array object deserialization in the MagentoFrameworkSessionSessionManager class via the $sessionConfig variable using the /rest/default/V1/guest-carts/abc/order endpoint of Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce to deploy an agent. First, the module will upload a PHP script in the /pub/media/customer_address/s/e directory of the web application using the /customer/address_file/upload endpoint. The default webroot directory value (/var/www/html/magento/pub/) can be changed using the WEBROOT module parameter. Then, it will trigger the vulnerability using a crafted PHP array object via the /rest/default/V1/guest-carts/abc/order endpoint, that will copy the uploaded PHP script to the given webroot directory. Finally, it will deploy the agent by calling the PHP script in the webroot directory. It's important to notice that the apache user account (www-data) must have write access to the webroot directory for this exploit to work. The deployed agent will run with the apache user account (www-data) privileges.

This module exploits a nested PHP array object deserialization in the MagentoFrameworkSessionSessionManager class via the $sessionConfig variable using the /rest/default/V1/guest-carts/abc/order endpoint of Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce to deploy an agent. First, the module will upload a PHP script in the /pub/media/customer_address/s/e directory of the web application using the /customer/address_file/upload endpoint. The default webroot directory value (/var/www/html/magento/pub/) can be changed using the WEBROOT module parameter. Then, it will trigger the vulnerability using a crafted PHP array object via the /rest/default/V1/guest-carts/abc/order endpoint, that will copy the uploaded PHP script to the given webroot directory. Finally, it will deploy the agent by calling the PHP script in the webroot directory. It's important to notice that the apache user account (www-data) must have write access to the webroot directory for this exploit to work. The deployed agent will run with the apache user account (www-data) privileges.

This module exploits a Server-Side Request Forgery via the getUiType parameter in the /OA_HTML/configurator/UiServlet endpoint of Oracle E-Business Suite to deploy an agent. First, the module will register an endpoint in the local webserver that will be used in the attack to send a xsl file to the target that will execute system commands to deploy the agent. Then, it will retrieve a required CSRF token via the /OA_HTML/runforms.jsp and /OA_HTML/JavaScriptServlet endpoints. Finally, it will use the Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability combined with a Carriage Return/Line Feed (CRLF) injection to smuggle a request to the /OA_HTML/help/../ieshostedsurvey.jsp endpoint that will trigger a GET HTTP request to the local webserver, which will, in turn, deliver the xsl file that will deploy the agent. The deployed agent will run with the oracle user account privileges.