Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner 10.0 build 20160216 and previous versions, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of the scanner GUI. The flaw exists in the way Acunetix WVS render some html elements inside it's GUI, using jscript.dll without any concert about unsafe ActiveX object such as WScript.shell. If Acunetix WVS triggers a vulnerability during a scan session, it saves a local html with the content of html page. With this, it's possible to trigger a fake vulnerability and inject a JavaScript code which triggers the remote command execution. This module also abuses of a second vulnerability affecting the Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner Scheduler. The Scheduler allows programmatically scanning of websites without any user interaction. It is possible to schedule a scan via the web interface listening on 127.0.0.1:8183. When a scan is scheduled, a new instance of Acunetix WVS is launched as SYSTEM. Previous to the real scan, several tests are performed on the target host using script files located in %ProgramData%\Acunetix WVS 10\Data\Scripts. Due to bad ACL's in this folder, any user can modify these scripts files. This module modifies the AJP_Audit.script file in order to execute an agent as SYSTEM.
The Password Manager component installed by various Trend Micro products runs a Node.js HTTP server by default. This web server opens multiple HTTP RPC ports for handling API requests. For example, the openUrlInDefaultBrowser API function, which internally maps to a ShellExecute function call, allows and attacker to execute arbitrary commands on localhost without the need of any type of credentials. This module will wait for a vulnerable target to connect and deploy an agent by abusing the mentioned API functionallity provided by the vulnerable component.
The Filter function of the VBScript engine in Microsoft Internet Explorer is prone to a type confusion vulnerability when processing specially crafted parameters. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable machines by enticing unsuspecting users to visit a specially crafted website. In order to bypass ASLR, this module also exploits a memory disclosure vulnerability from the same Microsoft security bulletin. This second vulnerability exists in the IE JavaScript engine when dealing with ArrayBuffer objects.
The vulnerability is due to an error while parsing crafted PRX files which can result in an buffer overflow. This module runs a malicious web site on the Core Impact Console and waits for an unsuspecting user to trigger the exploit by connecting to the web site.
Windows Media Center MCL files can specify a URL to be automatically loaded within Media Center. A specially crafted MCL file can abuse this URL parameter in order to trick Windows Media Center into rendering the very same MCL file as a local HTML file within the application's embedded web browser. This way, attacker-controlled Javascript code can run in the context of embedded IE's Local Machine Zone with no security prompts, since Media Center does not opt-in for the Local Machine Zone Lockdown policy. This can be leveraged by an attacker to read and exfiltrate arbitrary files from a victim's local fileystem by convincing an unsuspecting user to open an MCL file. This module will try to steal a couple files that should be present on every vulnerable machine (the mshta.exe executable from the Windows\System32 folder and the WindowsUpdate.log file) in order to confirm the existence of the vulnerability. The module can be configured through the "Files to retrieve" parameters group to try to steal a predefined set of important user files from the Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox web browsers (such as the Cookies, History, Preferences and Bookmarks files), and the Mozilla Thunderbird email client (address book, preferences, emails). However, note that web browser's History files and Thunderbird's email databases can be pretty big; in those cases, Windows Media Center can get stuck for minutes while trying to read those files. In order to steal Chrome/Firefox/Thunderbird files, the MCL file needs to infer the location of the %USERPROFILE% folder (typically something like C:\Users\JohnDoe) by inspecting its own current path. That means that stealing files from the %USERPROFILE% folder will only work if the MCL file is opened from a path under the %USERPROFILE% folder in the victim's machine, such as the Desktop, the "My Documents" folder, or the "Downloads" folder. The "Files to retrieve" parameters group also accepts a text file containing a custom list of files to be retrieved from the target system. Retrieved files will be saved to the folder specified in the OUTPUT FOLDER parameter. The module will create a separate folder for every compromised target.
The vulnerability is due to an error while parsing ThinApp compressed files which can result in an buffer overflow. This module runs a malicious web site on the Core Impact Console and waits for an unsuspecting user to trigger the exploit by connecting to the web site.
This module exploits a vulnerability in Moxa VPort SDK. This module runs a malicious web site on the CORE IMPACT Console and waits for an unsuspecting user to trigger the exploit by connecting to the web site. This exploit works only with ActiveX implementation (VPortSDK.ocx) of Moxa VProt SDK through Microsoft Internet Explorer 6, 7 and 8.
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