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Strong payload obfuscation and encryption

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STRATEGIC SECURITY FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION

Introduction

ABOUT

- Networked computing devices are exploitable.
- If the attacker can access the computer through a wire, wirelessly or physically, he might exploit it.

Introduction

NEXT

- Understanding the attacker, yes.
- Once the attacker has compromised the network, the *Security Officer* in charge must know
 - What has happened?
 - Could the attack have been avoided?
 - Is there any legal evidence?
 - What were the attacker's plans?

The Anatomy of an Attack

The Beginning of an Attack

THE EXPLOIT

- The attacker exploits a bug in a vulnerable system.
- This also means that the exploit evaded the computer's protection.
- We must admit that this will happen.
 - 0-days
 - Unpatched systems

Caveat: all the following attacks require that the attacker has the ability to run his code in the hacked system.

The Second Step of an Attack

THE PAYLOAD

- Targeting step:
 - Search for a specific user/system, email account, etc.
 - Or grow a well-sized network of attacked systems.
- Execution step(s):
 - Steal credentials, credit cards, source code or contacts.
 - DDoS a list of IP addresses.
 - Delete all databases; etcetera.
 - Spying

Detection

TUNING UP

- The hacked network can have some *detection programs* that **log** security-related events.
- Paradigm:
 - some attacks can be stopped, those we stop.
 - Others are detected with some innocent behavior, this we log.
- The Security Officer (SO) inspects these logs periodically, looking for suspicious information.

After detection, Investigation

WHAT'S DONE

- Logs and all the forensic information allow the SO to answer:
 - What has the attacker done?
 - Could it be prevented in the future?
 - Did he leave any evidence? Backdoors?
 - What was his aim?
- Let's say the attacker is caught in the act:
 - Same questions as above.

Let's study attacks!

Attack 1: will do anything

A FIRST PAYLOAD EXAMPLE

- The payload is a system call (syscall) proxying server.
- Through a syscall-proxying client the attacker sends syscalls to the target, which are executed there, and the result is returned.
- It is a lightweight payload *injected* in a running process.
- No data is written to disk!
- Communications
 - Go through standard channels
 - encrypted with AES.

Defense

DETECTING ATTACK 1

- Only a combination of reverse engineering and a log-everything approach will work.
 - A word on host-IDSs that monitor syscalls
- The SO must read *IDS logs* and locate the syscall-proxying server, the encrypted commands and the returned answers.
- *Reverse engineering* will help to
 - understand that the payload is a syscall-proxying server and
 - recover the AES key.

Attack 2: with one goal in mind

A 2nd EXAMPLE

- The attacker
 - Generates an AES key K ,
 - Computes $c := \text{SHA-1}(K)$
 - Encrypts his code as $\text{encryptedCode} := \text{AES}(K, \text{code})$
- The payload is embedded in a process
 - It listens in a fixed port for all incoming packets

For every packet x it computes $\text{SHA-1}(x)$

If $\text{SHA-1}(x) = c$ then

execute $\text{AES}^{-1}(x, \text{encryptedCode})$

Attack 2': with n goals in mind

A 2nd EXAMPLE (revisited)

- In fact, there are many keys k_1, \dots, k_{15}
- Each encrypting a different functionality.
- The hashes $c_i := \text{SHA-1}(k_i)$ are stored in a hash table together with many nonces.
- The encrypted functions are stored one after the other in memory, and its startpoint and endpoint is computed from the keys.

After detection, what?

- Now the SO has to reverse engineer the obfuscated payload, and find out what it does.
- Look for (candidate) keys, i.e., every string that entered the network.
- Brute force the encrypted functions.
- But he doesn't know $n!$ In fact, it could be made worse...

Attack techniques

Before things get too complicated,
let's check two useful tricks

Trick 1: Cryptography, use cryptography

The attacker can use cryptography

- An authentication/key generation to authenticate agent with the attacker and ensure confidentiality.
- An encryption scheme with backwards secrecy to prevent the SO from obtaining old messages.
- MACs to ensure the integrity of communication.

Implementing Cryptography in Agents

THREE VARIANTS

- V1: The attacker must do some pre-processing:
 - Compile it using shellforge ([P. Biondi]) or Gera's magic makefile ([Gera]).
 - Send the source code for a C implementation of this crypto functions.
- V2: Using Virtual machines for remote execution
 - Install an agent in the target machine that runs Mosquito
 - Send the source code for a Lisp1 implementation of this crypto functions

Implementing Cryptography in Agents

THREE VARIANTS

- V3: Save the trouble, but spend some more bandwidth:
 - In a first stage send a compiled **userland exec**. This is an agent that receives any executable (in the targeted machine) and runs it.
 - Next compile in **his** machine all the crypto functions, and send the .exe to the port where userland exec listens.

Note: In the future, when we need to execute *any* functionality, we shall use one of these techniques.

Trick 2: Obfuscation with Secure Triggers

Program Obfuscation

- Informally, a program in binary or source code form is said *obfuscated* if it cannot be analyzed.
- Historically:
 - There are many *ad hoc* methods for obfuscating code.
 - Theoretical results imply that obfuscation is not possible in a general setting.
- We have a practical and theoretically secure obfuscation method for the attack scenario.

Code obfuscation (2)

- Let k be an AES key and $c := \text{SHA-1}(k)$ its hash.
- Let P be data (e.g., computer code) and let $e := \text{AES}(k, P)$ be its encryption with k .

- Consider the program

```
INPUT x
if SHA-1(x)=c then execute AES-1(x,e);
```

- Assume you are analyzing this code without further info. What does it do?

More triggering criteria

- Simple trigger: the input matches a given bitstring
- Subset trigger: the input is a bitstring where certain bits contain a prespecified value (e.g., the input (x_1, \dots, x_n) in $\{0, 1\}^n$ verifies $x_{11}=1$, $x_{25}=1$, $x_{72}=0$, ...).
- Multiple-strings trigger: the input bitstring contains a set of prespecified sub-strings
- Fuzzy combinations, operations, ...

*Payload obfuscation and cryptography
in the benefit of the attacker*

Private information stealing

- Is the analog of Private Information Retrieval.
 - Search: The attacker searches for a directory/file or email account, and he knows its name.
 - Privacy: He doesn't want anyone to analyse the code and guess what it is looking for.
- Next, the attacker wants to mail him this file, encrypted.
- A simple trigger can be used to this end!

Setup

```
K:=filename;  
hk:=Hash(K);  
C:=E(K,mailingProgram)
```

Code

```
Scan the hard drive;  
For every file found do:  
    If Hash(file)=hk then  
        execute D(file, C);
```

Private information stealing: analysis

- This program makes little noise (in terms of generating security logs).
- An *a priori* analysis will render that the code is searching for *something*, and after it is found it will execute *some* functionality.
- To learn the *some*, first we must discover the *something*.
- Finding *something*:
 - Bootstrap the code and wait for the *something* to be found
 - Attempt to guess what it is looking for.

More searching

- Actually, using the bit-string trigger the attacker can also look for
 - Specially-formed packets or files (protocols)
 - Use combinations (e.g., an email from X to Y)
- Similar analyses apply to this variants.
 - Only that the brute force search can be made more difficult!

Time bombs

USING TIME-RELEASED CRYPTO [Rivest-Shamir-Wagner 96]

- A TRC encryption scheme
 - allows to set a “time counter” and then encrypt a secret, so that it can be decrypted after the counter reaches zero.
 - It relies on un-parallelizable number theory computations (i.e., $g^{(2^{22})}$).

- The attacker develops a worm that
 - a) spreads
 - b) “starts the counter” in order to decrypt the secret (an executable functionality).
 - c) When the secret is decrypted, it executes the functionality and broadcasts the key to other bots

Time bombs: analysis

- The computations will require little processor time and memory.
- There is always the sit-and-wait approach.
- There is no brute-forcing (too big key space)
- Breaking the crypto scheme

Anonymization: analysis

- If the SO captures the bots/agents
 - Stop messages from being delivered (in both directions)
 - he can witness what they encrypt before it is done
 - Then try to catch the attacker when he connects to the forum. Although this approach has some problems.
- Else, there's little he can do!

Anonymization of the attacker

- The attacker can be anonymized when he sends and receives messages.
- Say we are in the setting of Example 2 (many triggers)
- He communicates with his bots through public forums, there's a preset list.
 - Messages from bots are posted encrypted.
 - “Orders” for the bots are posted in the forum as links: <http://wormIP/key> , and indexers take care of the rest!

Coercion attacks

- The attacker can make any “good-willed” entity surrender their private key.
- He simply makes a worm that
 - Spreads as much as possible
 - Encrypts the hard drive using the underlying public key
 - Then prints the message: Call target entity and ask them for the key.
- That's it!

In closing...

- Reminder: know your enemy
- Studying how harmful can attacks be.
- About logging: what and where?
- Reverse engineering
- We need better detection mechanisms

So long and many thanks.

Any questions?

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