Advanced Software Protection Now

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Abstract. We introduce a novel software-protection method, which can be fully implemented with today’s technologies, that provides traitor tracing and license-enforcement functionalities, and requires no additional hardware nor inter-connectivity other than those needed to execute the respective protected software.

In [1] authors introduce the secure triggers and show that it is secure, modulo the existence of an ind-\textsc{cpa} secure block cipher. In this work, we present a framework for license enforcement and fingerprinting of computer programs in which these capabilities are coupled with secure triggers to produce a secure software protection system.

1 Introduction

Software piracy has troubled the computer industry, producing millions of dollars of losses, and rising numerous scientific and technical problems of interest in computer security (see, e.g., [2], [3], [4]). Software is hardly sold, but it is typically licensed according to policies defined by software license owners. Licensed software is executed within the licensed customers’ computers and is expected to be run according to license policy. For example, the license may establish that only users from an authorized IP address can use it, or that it can only run on a specific computer, or establishes an expiration date. However, the license owner does not have any technical warranties to enforce his policy, unless he uses a secure software protection system. The need for one such system remains after a long history of trials (see, e.g., [5], [2]).

1.1 Background

Software protection aims at enforcing license policy through technical means, sometimes profiting from special-purpose hardware devices, and being supported by digital rights management legislations. Fingerprinting is roughly defined as the act of uniquely marking and registering a
build of the program allowing the license owner to trace back a copy of this build to its original licensee ([6]). Today, there is no agreement on how can license enforcement and traitor tracing be implemented. It is commonly acknowledged that given sufficient time (within human reach) and effort an attacker will crack any protection system. As a result, software protection systems attempt to discourage crackers by making the cracking job a highly difficult (e.g., time-consuming) task.

In the past, software protection solutions have tried to make (portions of) the software “unavailable” for inspection by its users. Assuming available a procedure that provides this functionality, we could construct a software protection system by making license checks in this “unavailable mode” (because an attacker cannot thwart license checks he cannot access). Among other things, software protection studies how to provide this “unavailability” through code obfuscation (see, e.g., [7], [8], [9]). Obfuscation, in software engineering, comprises the techniques used for preventing software analysis methods to produce qualitative results. On the other side, reverse engineering (e.g., program comprehension; see, e.g., [10]), is the de facto software analysis discipline.

Regrettably, Barak et alii ([11]) give a negative result on obfuscation in the context of computational complexity, namely that obfuscation procedures can be defeated. More explicitly, they show that for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine obfuscator, which receives as input a polynomial-time Turing machine (hereafter TM) and outputs a polynomial-time TM with the same functionality but such that only its input/output behavior is revealed by inspection, there exists a polynomial “deobfuscator” that learns more than just the I/O behavior.

Notice that [11] gives only an existential result, and the construction of deobfuscators remains an interesting problem. Moreover, manual obfuscation is still possible, and the “international obfuscated C code contest” ([12]) is a good example of this. It seems that the notion of automated TM obfuscation is too restrictive, and that a straightforward computational complexity approach to software protection will not suffice to give a definitive answer (whether software protection is possible or not). Our thesis is that an hybrid approach, which combines computational complexity with software engineering, can be used to analyze a software protection system with the necessary detail. Evidence of this can be found in modern reverse engineering literature (e.g., [13], [14], [15]). This work follows a new research direction integrating hardness results to the software engineering and reverse engineering disciplines to the design of software protection systems (cf. [4], [16], [13]).
1.2 Prior art

In the past two decades (‘80, ’90) countering reverse engineering was endeavored either by encrypting the software, or by having it run on trusted environments or tamper-proof hardware devices. Unfortunately, typical hardware solutions have remained useless or too expensive (see, e.g., [17], [18], [19]); the case of typical software-only solutions has remained invariably insecure (see, e.g., [20], [5]). These solutions either violate Kherchoff’s principle (e.g., rely on security by obscurity) or at least rely on hypotheses on debuggers or hardware devices that cannot be verified (cf. [21]). “Computation with encrypted data” (e.g., [9]) provides an alternative approach, but no solution applicable to generic software has been found yet. So it has often been possible to circumvent anti-piracy procedures by reusable methods that could be wide-spread over the Internet.4

Some novel software protection systems, such as our own, aim to discourage crackers by counter-attacking reverse engineering tools, for example [4] provides an obfuscation tool-set aimed at obstructing static (flow-sensitive) code analysis; [24] proposes tamper-proofing of license enforcement by coupling license enforcement tools with dynamically self-checking programs; [16] presents an obfuscation method that aims at reducing de-obfuscation to solving the acceptance problem on linear Turing machines (which is PSPACE-complete). However, these models for security are incomplete and there remains to answer if they are secure in a realistic sense (e.g., cannot be countered by crackers). The case of the Trusted Computing Group ([25]) is different, TCG plans to provide a new generation of personal computers that, among other things, allow for DRM of content and software. This solution requires a technology that is now unavailable, has not been inspected by the public, and it will take years before this solution is effectively implemented.

2 Results

This work addresses two complementary goals. First, to present a semi-automated method for software protection that addresses today’s problematic, and can be implemented and used within the actual technology. It enforces license policy, in the sense that it will not run when policy is violated, and incorporates effectively traceable fingerprints. As a second goal, we propose a very realistic model of security for software protection systems, and analyze the security of our system.

4 Crackers and hackers web-pages as [22] or [23] contain very complete lists of cracks and serial number generators for almost every licensed software.
We will assume the reader has some knowledge of software development and cryptography. An introduction to these subjects can be found in [26] and [27].

2.1 Architecture and implementation

The protection system can be applied to the source code of a C/C++ program, developed for win32 or Unix platforms requiring no additional hardware nor connectivity. Additionally, we introduce a traitor-tracing system that detects these fingerprints (e.g., if a licensee redistributes his copy on the internet, he can be traced by this procedure). We describe both procedures and give implementation directions.

The protection system requires the intervention of a programmer, which need not be the original developer of the software, that we call the developer. The protection process consists of two phases where the source code of a program is transformed into a protected build. On the first (manual) phase, the developer is required to add pragma directives (directives for short) to the source code of the program that is being protected —specifying the location and name of the protection transforms (e.g., for fingerprinting or obfuscation). The manual phase is performed only once, either during or after development, and integrates to the development cycle enabling debugging and barely augmenting the development work. In the second (automated) phase, the protection system transforms the modified source code into a customized build according to both the directives added and a configuration file containing a license ID and license constraints.

2.2 Model and Security

The threat model is defined by a developer that uses this protection system to transform the source code of the program into (protected) builds. Each build includes an ID and license constraints, and is delivered to the licensed customer as binary code. A valid attack against our system will consist on a sequence of analyses and transformations to a set of builds done with crackers’ tools.

Crackers’ tools are: Disassemblers and decompilers (e.g., [28]), debuggers (e.g., [29]), auto-decryptors and auto-decompressors, and analyzers

5 The underlying method can be deduced from this paper and then be extended for protection systems on Java, Python and other programming languages —though that is not the aim of this paper.
for: API access patterns, application flow, and binary layout data. Theoretic counterparts for these tools are mainly static analysis methods (i.e., those analyzing the code from a frozen image of a build; see, e.g., [30], [31]), such as control- and data-flow static analysis; and dynamic analysis methods (i.e., those that infer the program’s properties through running a copy; see, e.g., [32]) such as frequency spectrum and coverage concept analysis. We argue that by making our system invulnerable to these “theoretic counterparts” we are in fact defending from the real attacks.

Attackers are said to succeed at cracking our protection system if they are able, either to bypass the license constraints, or to erase the fingerprints (avoiding traitor tracing) using the aforementioned tools.

The security provided by this system depends on both the program being protected and the directives inserted during protection. This observation differences our method from most protection methods. Moreover, we cannot assert that programs protected by our system become un-crackable, but aim to prove that this system helps to make crackers job more difficult. Our method can profit from the syntax of source code implementations (e.g., flow chart, number of variables used, functions implementations, etcetera) and the developer’s ability. We shall give guidelines for the manual phase so that any programmer can use it.

As for the security brought by our system, first we remark that a new interpretation of the secure triggers ([1]) technique, described in Section 3.1, can be used to obfuscate programs securely (e.g., obfuscation is as secure as a block cipher is).

Second, with our system the developer gains the ability to enforce policy by binding the program’s execution code with environment parameters. In particular, by binding the program’s execution with license information, the program will inject failures inside its own code, inevitably crashing, if there occur discrepancies between the expected values for these parameters and those actually assumed by them. Failures are injected both stealthily and dynamically, making them more difficult to detect (e.g., by static analysis algorithms).

Third, the protection system embeds fingerprints during the protection process that are spread throughout the code producing customized builds. No two are alike (even locally). Further, the secure triggers technique referenced above will augment fingerprinting capabilities so that cracking triggers is necessary for cracking fingerprinting.

Finally, notice that [11] does not apply to fingerprinting because our fingerprinting method does not pretend to hide fingerprints from crackers (as it happens with watermarking methods), but aims at replicating
fingerprints throughout the complete build so they cannot be removed. In fact, this impossibility result does not apply to license enforcement either, since in our case environment additional information—that is independent of the obfuscation process—needs to be fed for a protected program to run properly. Using a suitable strategy for the manual phase (see Section 5), both fingerprinting and license enforcement capabilities will change dynamically during the protected program’s lifetime as the different branches of the program are explored. More explicitly, the obfuscated portions of the program will be actually encrypted with a block cipher (e.g., AES), and the keys needed for decryption will be computed from environment variables and program parameters (some related to license conditions) on the fly as needed. As a result, a cracker will not be able to assert whether he has completely cracked a build until he has decrypted every enciphered portion of code. We will argue later that this is a difficult job, and hence so is cracking our system.

The paper continues as follows: in Section 3 we isolate the protection techniques required by this system. An implementation outline is drafted in Section 4. Strategic considerations for the manual phase follow in Section 5. Section 6 includes our conclusions and discuss results.

3 Tools and techniques for software protection

Our system performs transforms to the program following directives inserted in the manual phase. These transforms do not change the observable behavior of the program. They comprise cryptographic or software engineering methods that we introduce here as stand-alone algorithms. Implementation details follow in the next sections.

3.1 Obfuscation through secure triggers

Secure triggers are cryptographic primitives ideally suited for solving malicious-host problems of mobile computing (see [1], [33], cf. [7]). Generally speaking, given a predicate (i.e., a binary valued function) $p : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{\text{true, false}\}$ and a secret procedure $f$, a cryptographic trigger is an algorithm that executes the procedure $f$ on receiving the input $x$ only if $p(x) = \text{true}$, else it returns nothing. Secure triggers encompass algorithms that compute functions $t(f,p)$ and are secure against white-box analysis, say, that given complete access to the algorithm that computes the function $t(f,p)$, it is infeasible for an attacker to recover any semantic information regarding the procedure $f$. 
Every trigger’s overall behavior is similar, after setup the trigger will accept inputs and launch the secret procedure only if the trigger criterion is verified by the input. In [1] three trigger examples: The simple trigger will decrypt and launch the secret functionality if the input received matches a predefined value; the multi-strings trigger decrypts and launches if it receives a sequence of values that contains a predetermined subsequence, and the subset trigger decrypts and launches only when certain specific bits of the input hold a predetermined value (see Appendix for details). Browsing the code of these programs will render no key, nor what are the triggering bits in the latter case. The hardness result of Futuransky et alii, ibidem, states that: If there exists an ind-cca secure block cipher (see [27]), then no probabilistic polynomial time attacker can recover semantic information for $f$ when inspecting the algorithm $T(f,p)$ in any of the three examples described above. The appendix contains a description of these triggers and the underlying security results.

Let us now describe how is the simple trigger used in our protection system. The use of other triggers can be derived from it. Say that within the program’s source code we isolated a procedure $f$. Assume that the natural flow of the program assigns the value $k$ to the local variable $tmp$. Let $E$ and $D$ denote a pair of symmetric encryption and decryption primitives. We then use a simple trigger ($p(x) = \text{true}$ if, and only if, $x = k$) by replacing the procedure for $f$ by the algorithm on Figure 3.1, where

```plaintext
stored: iv, E(k, iv), E(k, f).
input: tmp.
output: $S$ or ⊥.
compute $E(tmp, iv)$;
If $E(tmp, iv) = E(k, iv)$
    then {output $D(tmp, E(k, f))$};
```

Fig. 1. The simple trigger

$E(k, f)$ denotes an encryption of a compiled $f$. A best usage strategy and implementation details are included in Sections 5 and 6.

### 3.2 Fingerprinting

We are particularly interested in software fingerprints that are robust and collusion resistant$^6$. Our approach to fingerprinting follows common

$^6$ A software fingerprint is robust if the it remains even after disassembly, modification and reassembly. The fingerprinting method is said collusion-resistant, if the method
practices (see, e.g., [34], [35], [36]) but profits from our architecture design and the use of secure triggers. Furthermore, the secure triggers technique turns this difficult-to-defeat fingerprinting system into a robust scheme.

The fingerprint module in our system is probabilistic: Every protected program is customized from a different ID (used as a seed). Static fingerprints are embedded by random modifications on the syntactic structure or layout of the source code that do not modify its functionality. After compilation, this random changes remain in the build. A suspected copy can be identified with the aid of our traitor tracing tool (see Section 4.2) by different statistic correlation analyses between the suspected copy and those copies stored by the software license owner.

The cornerstone of our fingerprinting method comes from the realization that programmers take arbitrary decisions during development, that this variations are present in the binaries, and that this slack can be harnessed for embedding fingerprints. Our approach is to have the developer manually identify the places in the source code open to arbitrary decisions, and then have the fingerprinting module to automatically randomize decisions on compilation. For example, developers arbitrarily decide the order in which a function accepts its arguments; with our method the developer will identify the arguments that can be arbitrarily reordered, then on each build the protection system will randomly reorder these arguments maintaining the code’s logic.

Other “permutables” include: local and global variable definitions, function definitions, struct members, class data members, class methods, enumerated types, constant arrays, object code link order, if/then/else statements, independent statements. As a result, a single permutation will introduce multiple changes on several parts of the binary code. For example, permuting the order of global variables definitions will produce a one byte difference in the binary code on each reference to these variables.

Random generated implementations for common-use functions (e.g., manipulation of constants, multiplication of large integers, etcetera) provide yet another fingerprinting channel. Say, for example, numeric constants can be replaced, automatically in each build, by functions evaluating to those same constants —with a minor performance penalty.

Software byproducts, such as intermediate or temporary files, can also be fingerprinted by methods similar to those used above aiding forensic practices (see [37]). Candidates for byproduct fingerprinting include intermediate or temporary files, saved documents, configuration or state remains robust even when the attacker is given a set of different fingerprinted builds but cannot produce a single untraceable build.
information, network traffic, and internal data structures. Fingerprints can be embedded, e.g., as order permutations, formatting and document layout, and packet encapsulation.

Robustness is then achieved with no significant effort: since the marks are embedded in no particular portion of the build but distributed throughout the code. To erase these fingerprints an attacker would first need to identify each of this random changes, then disassemble the said portion of the code and make the necessary modifications to erase this random changes following the code’s logic (e.g., if the protection swaps a couple of global variables, a cracker attempting to erase this mark would need to swap every appearance of this variables on the build). A more thorough discussion follows in Section 6. See also e.g., [38] and [39].

Dynamic fingerprints can also be inserted in several ways. For example, easter eggs (see, e.g., [34]) that hatch with fingerprinting information when accessed with special inputs can be embedded in the program and hidden through the usage of secure triggers. Say, for example, that if someone inserts an entry to the program’s database of a lady born on the year 2531, then the program decrypts and executes a function displaying the license ID on the screen.

3.3 License Enforcement

We aim to make license enforcement by binding the program’s (policy-conforming) execution to the values assumed for license parameters. More explicitly, we establish two levels of protection. First level license checks are used to inform the licensee when the licensed program cannot be used at that moment (e.g., because it has expired). No effort is made at this level neither to hide the location of these checks in the program nor to prevent attackers from removing them. The second level of license enforcement does counter cracking. Our parameter binding method consists in replacing certain program constants by functions that evaluate to the expected value for these constants only when the license parameters hold values conforming with license policy. The process is quite simple: During the manual phase of the protection, the developer identifies some constants in the source code that he wants to get bound on compilation, and he also supplies the functions that return license parameters (e.g.,

\[\text{7 For example, if the software has an expiration date, then the protection scheme checks for the current time with a standard system call. A cracker can hook this system call always returning a date falling before expiration, procedure completely breaks the first level of license enforcement.}\]
the present time, or the host IP number). The system will automatically make the binding on the second phase.

We give a simplistic example for second level checks: Suppose that license policy establishes that the software expires on 31-Dec-2009. Then, the protected program will “assume” that the second (rightmost) digit of the year is a 0, and thus several appearances of the constant 0 will be replaced by the variable “second rightmost digit of the year.” If the year 2010 is reached, and the attacker has circumvented the explicit checks (but not the parameter-binding ones) every function that replaces 0 by the variable “second rightmost digit of the year” will evaluate to 1, injecting faults in the program, and forcing the program to crash while failures spread during execution. In fact, different occurrences of the constant 0 will be replaced by different implementations of the function that returns the current time (e.g., the time of creation of temporary files and other timestamps within reach), making it more difficult to thwart these checks.

More generally, execution and operational parameters can be used to specify license constraints such as number of records held on a database, the time of the creation of a record, the number of simultaneous users, usage time elapsed, and any machine identification parameter.

To circumvent this license enforcement method a cracker must identify every license check and swindle the application with bogus information (e.g., hooking these checks and always returning the correct values). Since most of these checks will be obfuscated by secure triggers, the cracker will need to break the obfuscation scheme to remove license constraints.

4 Implementation

We give details for implementing a system that performs the automated phase of the protection process for C application projects (e.g., software applications) under Microsoft Visual Studio for the win32 platform.

We shall require the use of different cryptographic primitives that can to be chosen by the developer: A symmetric cipher, say AES in CBC mode, a hash function, say SHA-1, and a random pool (see, e.g., [27]).

4.1 Architecture

The system consists of three procedures: the crypto pre-processor procedure (CPPP), the compiler, and the post-processor. Additionally, it requires a library including the functions underlying triggers (e.g., decryption and integrity checks). The CPPP is the first module executed,
it receives as input a modified source code (e.g., that includes directives) and outputs a randomized source code. At startup it initializes the random pool as seeded by the configuration file (the pool’s required size is proportional to the number of directives in the source code). Then, the CPPP parses the source code individualizing the portions of code marked for transformation.

Subsequently the transforms are applied according the random pool and the marking directives. This system enables for the use of many transforms. In the following paragraphs we give a flavor of the transforms supported by this system introducing fingerprinting, license enforcement and obfuscation transforms. We start with an example of the permutation transform which reorders variable assignments:

```
fingerprint
    begin
    permute;
    a = 5;
b = 4;
tmp = "hello";
fingerprint
    end_permute;
```

The parser will identify the three assignments between the begin and end clauses. Reordering is done by first enumerating the permutable lines and then applying a successive swaps to the enumerated lines. Notice that these modifications do not change the program’s functionality.

Another fingerprinting directive is prepended to if/then/else statements as follows:

```
fingerprint
    if;
    if (a < 22) printf("yes"); else printf("no");
fingerprint
```

According to the next bit in the random pool this will leave the statement as it is or replace it by the equivalent statement

```
if (!a < 22) printf("no"); else printf("yes");
```

The `fingerprint_constant(value,size[,func=value2])` directive can be used in the declaration of constants for fingerprinting and license enforcement. The CPPP will replace the declaration of the constant prepended by this directive by randomly generated arithmetic expression of size `size` evaluating to `value`\(^8\). For example, the declaration `a:=2;` could be replaced by `a:=4 - (3*2) + 5 - 2 + 1;` which evaluates to 2. The optional argument is used for license enforcement, the function

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\(^8\) Compiler’s optimization options can be switched not to destroy these expressions, and still optimize producing a small slowdown.
func returns an operational parameter, that is assumed to take the value value2 (see Section 3.3 for details).

Triggers are handled by different encryption directives. The code to be encrypted is enclosed between directives, say between `simple_Trigger_begin(key)` and `simple_Trigger_end`. The CPPP will identify each trigger occurrence and add calls to the corresponding trigger function (e.g., that of Figure 3.1 in the case of the simple trigger) including also integrity checks, and will create a file in its working directory which contains references to the blocks associated to triggers (by specifying the starting line and ending line of each block in source code file). When running a protected program, if a function inside an encrypted block is required by the control flow of the program, the protected program will automatically compute the decryption key, (implicitly) check the validity of this key, decrypts the block, checks the block’s integrity against a pre-stored hash value, and finally execute it. The CPPP also configures the project makefile (i.e., where “details for files, dependencies and rules by which an executable application is built” are stored in msdev) to link the post-processor and the additional library to the project.

Then, the randomized source code computed by CPPP is compiled into a binary build with the msdev C compiler. The output of this procedure is an executable binary, except no blocks are encrypted. Encryption is handled by the post-processor module.

Finally, the post-processor modifies the binary files computed by the compiler, by encrypting specified blocks as needed and completing parameters used by the triggers. Explicitly, the post-processor makes two passes on these binary files. For each block marked for encryption, it first computes and stores its length in bytes and the symmetric key, and the hash value for the cleartext; then, on the second pass, it encrypts the block and copies on the build overwriting cleartexts and inserting auxiliary information.

### 4.2 Traitor tracing module

The traitor tracing module detects static fingerprints using simple statistics methods. Let \( n \) be a positive integer chosen by the developer. Say, \( n = 10 \). For every software build that has been delivered to a licensee, the traitor-tracing module will analyze the binaries making a dictionary of all the \( n \) byte strings appearing within this file. This dictionary is constructed by hash tables requiring a computation time proportional to the size of the program and the number of copies delivered.
When a suspected build is found it is parsed into \( n \) bytes strings and each string is looked up in the dictionary. Then, for each protected build, the following statistic parameters are computed: i) the number of strings that can be found only in the suspected copy and this build, ii) it also computes the number of strings found in the suspected copy, this build, and some other delivered build; iii) the number of strings that can be found in the suspected copy and every delivered build.

Dynamic fingerprints such as easter eggs can be detected automatically: A single-sing-on procedure will start the program and take the necessary steps to insert the special entries on the databases so that the hidden license ID value is displayed. More information on dynamic fingerprints can be found in Sections 3.2 and 6.

5 The developer’s strategy

In this section we shall describe strategies for the manual phase that will result in a stronger protection. We remark that the security of programs protected by our system will depend on their characteristics and on the developer’s job during the manual phase.

The recommended strategy will be aimed at making the fingerprinting robust and making license checks hard to crack. We recommend to: i) use the fingerprinting commands whenever possible, maximizing the randomization within protected builds; ii) replace constants in the program with the license enforcement primitive in error-prone places of the program, so that when license fails the failures injected are hard to reproduce and will get the program to behave erratically; iii) spread license checks through the length of the code and within every trigger’s encrypted portion of software; iv) maximize the number of access channels to the license parameters (e.g., retrieve the actual time using different functions); v) insert fake triggers, i.e., that are not reached by normal executions, both allowing fingerprinting and making infeasible to the attacker the job of decrypting every trigger; vi) nest occurrences of triggers; vii) make the keys used by triggers non-obvious deriving them from variables that are permanently updated (e.g., so that these variables take the value of the key only when it is needed).

6 Discussion

This section serves two purposes, on the one side it describes the strength of this protection system, on the other it complements Sections 3 and 5.
giving insight on how to counter the attackers’ tools. We analyze the strength of several attack strategies against our method.

We first discuss the effectivity of our traitor tracing module. Suppose that we have recovered a pirate copy and want to identify its origin. Initially, the developer will try to check for explicit client IDs. In case they were removed by crackers, the traitor tracing module is run.

Attempts at “destroying” every fingerprint through code re-optimization are futile for several reasons. For example, because optimization tools will not be able to difference between low-use and fake code —being dead-code elimination an intractable problem ([40], cf. [41]).

Frequency spectrum analysis and other kinds of dynamic analyses will not be able to difference easter-egg dynamic fingerprints from those pieces of code that are rarely used (e.g., code that is executed only under very particular situations). Also, since static fingerprints were provoked by arbitrary decisions (that might look meaningful inside the code) an automatic tool may not be able to remove them all. It turns out, that typical software solutions for re-optimization cannot be used to delete these fingerprints (we give more details below).

Furthermore, since certain parts of the code are encrypted by trigger procedures, the attacker will need to decrypt them to find out if they contain fingerprints and have them deleted.

As an experiment, a 1.2 Mb win32 executable was marked with fingerprinting directives (and no encryption directives). Twelve different builds were compiled (using different IDs) rising the compilation time of 45 minutes (without protection) in a couple of minutes (and less than an hour in all if triggers are used). The resulting files were analyzed using the traitor tracing tool doing statistics with \( n = 10 \) bytes strings in a few seconds. The size of the resulting dictionary was of 440,000 values, for the 1,200,000 totality of strings (recall that the file is 1.2Mb long). About 182,000 of the values of the dictionary were present in every build. For each build, the percentage of strings appearing in it and no other build ranged from 20% to 30% of the size of the dictionary —giving an excellent identification ratio. On the other hand, an average less than 40% of the entries in each build were present on only one other build. Cut-and-paste attacks, collusion attacks attempting to replace pieces of a build by other build’s pieces in order to remove fingerprints, are not likely to succeed facing this statistics (e.g., almost half of the builds are needed to produce an unmarked copy). In fact, cut-and-paste attacks fail because the mixing builds produces inconsistencies in the variable’s assignations, and in particular for those used by triggers’ functions.
To counter license constraints the attacker has two approaches ([3]) he can either identify every function (within the protected software) executing a license check and patch it, or he can identify every attribute that is checked and patch it so the miss-match cannot be detected. In any case, attackers would need to analyze the program’s code in order to identify what is checked or how it is checked. Notice that static analysis tools will fail since encrypted portions of code will not be readable by these tools.

Also notice that, since the different portions of the code are disclosed gradually (e.g., the program is not decrypted at once), new checks might appear at any time (unannounced). An attacker cannot ensure he has removed every check unless every single portion of the code has been analyzed (even fake triggers).

So far we have argued that cracking is impossible, unless every trigger occurrence is inspected and license checks are thwarted. A method to systematically do this would inevitably take the following steps: i) Find the decryption algorithm entry points (e.g., searching for decryption algorithm’s magic constants). ii) Then modify the decryption function to include a key-logger by adding a procedure that saves the keys used whenever a portion of code is decrypted. iii) Trigger every block, by intensively using the application exploring every possible execution path. This procedure will get every encrypted portion of code decrypted. Except step iii), all the others can be automated and efficiently implemented. However, following every path of a computer program is an intractable problem (e.g., as difficult as the halting problem) that grows exponentially with the number of branches in the program.

As we noted, none of the above attacks, attempting to reveal every trigger block, is feasible. Further, a cracker will not be able to assert if a trigger is fake unless he understands all the related code. But, that is precisely our goal: making it necessary for a successful attack to take the time and effort to understand the complete code of the program and then erase the protection’s fingerprints and thwart license constraints.

References

A Secure triggers

We follow [1]. Futuransky et alii, ibidem describes different secure triggers in the “universally composable security (UCS) framework” of R. Canetti ([43]). We give a concise description of the underlying algorithms and security results (for a complete description see [1] and [43]).

Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a ind-cpa secure symmetric cipher.

A.1 The simple trigger protocol

Let $S \in \{0,1\}^*$ be a secret procedure described as a string of bits. Fix $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ a security parameter. On set up we run the key generation algorithm Gen to produce a key $k$ of size $k$ and arbitrarily choose a string $iv \in \{0,1\}^k$. Then we compute $Enc_k(iv)$, $Enc_k(S)$ and initialize the algorithm in Figure 3.1 with these three values.

Security follows from the indistinguishability property of the symmetric cipher (see [1, Th. 3.1]). Or, in the language of [44], for any attacker $A$ against this scheme there exists an attacker $A'$ against the ind-cpa security of the block cipher (with a single known plaintext), such that the advantage $A$ has is smaller than the advantage of $A'$.

A.2 Subsequence trigger

For the subsequence trigger procedure, the trigger criterion is satisfied when a pre-defined subset of an input message (considered as a sequence of bits) matches a particular value. Formally, let $s, k$ be positive integers with $s > k$. This trigger family is defined by the predicates

$$\left\{ p_K : \{0,1\}^s \to \{\text{true, false}\} : K \subset \{1,2,\ldots,s\} \times \{0,1\}, \#K = k, \text{ and if } (i,b),(i,b') \in K \text{ then } b = b' \right\}$$

A predicate $p_K$ evaluates to true on input $x = (x_1,\ldots,x_s) \in \{0,1\}^s$, if and only if, for every pair $(i,b)$ in $K$, it holds true that $x_i = b$. 

---

To implement this trigger we construct an auxiliary family of (polynomially-computable, uninvertible) functions from \( \{0, 1\}^s \) to \( \{0, 1\}^k \), such that a member \( \tau \) verifies:

i) given \( x \) in \( \{0, 1\}^s \), there exist indices \( j_1, \ldots, j_k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, s\} \subset \mathbb{Z} \) such that
- \( \tau(x) = \tau(x_{j_1}, \ldots, x_{j_k}) \), and
- if \( y \in \{0, 1\}^s \) is such that \( y_{j_\ell} = x_{j_\ell} \) for \( 1 \leq \ell \leq k \), then both values have the same output \( \tau(x) = \tau(y) \).

ii) \( \tau \) is onto, and for every \( y \in \{0, 1\}^k \) the cardinality of the preimage \( \tau^{-1}(y) \) is \( 2^{s-k} \).

Assume \( \tau \) has this properties, and fix values \( x \in \{0, 1\}^s \) and \( b := (b_1, \ldots, b_k) := \tau(x) \). Let \( p \) be the predicate defined by \( p(y) = \text{true} \) if and only if \( \tau(x) = b \). By hypotheses, there exist indices \( 1 \leq i_1, \ldots, i_k \leq s \) such that \( b = \tau(x) = (x_{i_1}, \ldots, x_{i_k}) \) and for every \( y \in \{0, 1\}^s \) that, for \( 1 \leq j \leq k \), satisfies \( y_{i_j} = x_{i_j} \), the equality \( \tau(x) = \tau(y) \) holds. Hence, if \( p(x) \) is \text{true}, then \( p(y) \) is also true.

With out further ado let \( Hash : \{0, 1\}^* \to \{0, 1\}^m \) denote a one-way hash function and let the function family

\[
\{ \sigma_{(t_1, \ldots, t_s)} : \{1, 2, \ldots, s\} \times \{0, 1\}^s \to \{0, 1\}^k ; t_i \in \{0, 1\}^m, \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq s \}
\]

be defined by the assignment \( \sigma_{(t_1, \ldots, t_s)}(i, x) := y := (y_1, \ldots, y_k) \) and the procedure in Figure A.2. Given any function \( \sigma \) from this family, notice

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Stored: } & (t_1, \ldots, t_s). \\
\text{Input: } & i, (x_1, \ldots, x_s). \\
\text{Output: } & (y_1, \ldots, y_k). \end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{set } & i_1 := i; y_1 := x_i; I := \{i_1\}; \\
\text{for } & n := 2 \text{ to } k \text{ do } \{ \\
\text{compute } & i := (Hash(y_1||\ldots||y_{n-1}) \oplus t_n) \mod (s); \\
\text{compute } & i := i + \# \{ j : j \in I \land j \leq i \}; I := I \cup \{i\}; \\
\text{set } & i_n := i; y_n := x_i; \} \\
\text{output } & (y_1, \ldots, y_k); \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 2. The auxiliary function

that for every \( i, 1 \leq i \leq s \), \( \tau := \sigma(i, ) : \{0, 1\}^s \to \{0, 1\}^k \) trivially verifies properties i) and ii).
The algorithm for this trigger can now be explained. Let $S \in \{0,1\}^*$ be the secret procedure. Let $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a ind-cpa secure symmetric cipher. On the initialization, we run the key generation algorithm and get a key $b = (b_1, \ldots, b_k)$ of size $k$, we randomly choose bit-strings $t_1, \ldots, t_s \in \{0,1\}^m$ of size $m$, and arbitrarily chooses a bit-string $iv$ (of size $k$), finally we compute $\text{Enc}_b(iv), \text{Enc}_b(S)$ and store these values.

Let $\sigma := \sigma(t_1, \ldots, t_s)$ be the function induced by the stored values $t_1, \ldots, t_s$. Let $x$ denote the input of the trigger algorithm, then this algorithm for every $i, 1 \leq i \leq s$ computes $\tau(i, x)$ and checks if $\text{Dec}_\sigma(i, x)(\text{Enc}_b(iv))$ for any $i, 1 \leq i \leq s$. If this happens, it must be that $\sigma(i, x) = b$ and the algorithm (computes and) outputs the secret $S$.

Security follows from [1, Th. 3.2].

### A.3 Multiple-strings trigger

Let $k, s \in \mathbb{Z}$ be integers with $s \geq 2$, where $k$ is the security parameter and $s$ is the number of keys that are used to trigger. The trigger family is then defined by the predicates

$$\left\{ p_{k_1, \ldots, k_s} : \{0,1\}^* \to \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}; k_1, \ldots, k_s \in \{0,1\}^k \right\},$$

where the predicate $p_{k_1, \ldots, k_s}(x) = \text{true}$ on input $x$ if, writing $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_t)$ there exist indices $i_1, \ldots, i_s$ such that $(x_{i_1}, \ldots, x_{i_1+k-1}) = k_1, \ldots, (x_{i_s}, \ldots, x_{i_s+k-1}) = k_s$.

We describe the algorithm for this trigger. Fix $s \in \mathbb{N}$. On initialization we use the key generation algorithm $\text{Gen}$ to generate keys $k_1, \ldots, k_s$ of size $k$, compute a random bit-string $iv$ of size $k$, and finally computes $\text{Enc}_{k_1}(iv), \ldots, \text{Enc}_{k_s}(iv)$ and $\text{Enc}_{\oplus^s k_s}(S)$. These values are stored for the algorithm to access. For every input $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, the triggerer procedure checks for the existence of integers $1 \leq i_1, \ldots, i_k \leq m$ such that $\text{Enc}_{k_j}(iv) = \text{Enc}_{k_j}(iv)$ holds for all $j$. If it does, it then computes $\oplus(x_{i_1}, \ldots, x_{i_1+k-1})$ and $S = \text{Dec}_{\oplus^s(x_{i_1}, \ldots, x_{i_1+k-1})}(\text{Enc}_{\oplus^s k_s}(S))$ and outputs $S$.

Security follows from [1, Th. 3.3].