Dnsmasq Heap Overflow and NULL-pointer derreference on TFTP Server

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Dnsmasq Heap Overflow and Null-pointer Dereference on TFTP Server

1.
Advisory Information

Title: Dnsmasq Heap Overflow and Null-pointer Dereference on TFTP Server
Advisory ID: CORE-2009-0820
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/content/dnsmasq-vulnerabilities

Date published:
2009-08-31
Date of last update: 2009-08-31
Vendors contacted: Simon Kelley
Release mode: Coordinated release

2.
Vulnerability Information

Class: Buffer overflow
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
Bugtraq ID: 36120, 36121
CVE Name: CVE-2009-2957, CVE-2009-2958

3.
Vulnerability Description

Dnsmasq is a lightweight DNS forwarder and DHCP server.
A vulnerability has been found that may allow an attacker
to execute arbitrary code on servers or home routers running dnsmasq
[1]

with the TFTP service
[2]

[3]
enabled (--enable-tfp).
This service is not enabled by default on most distributions; in particular it is not enabled by default on
OpenWRT or DD-WRT.
Chances of successful exploitation increase when a long directory prefix is used for TFTP.
Code will be executed with the privileges of the user running dnsmasq, which is normally a non-privileged one.

Additionally there is a potential DoS attack to the TFTP service by exploiting a
null-pointer dereference vulnerability.

4.
Vulnerable packages

  • dnsmasq 2.40.
  • dnsmasq 2.41.
  • dnsmasq 2.42.
  • dnsmasq 2.43.
  • dnsmasq 2.44.
  • dnsmasq 2.45.
  • dnsmasq 2.46.
  • dnsmasq 2.47.
  • dnsmasq 2.48.
  • dnsmasq 2.49.
  • Older versions are probably affected too, but they were
    not checked.

5.
Non-vulnerable packages

  • dnsmasq 2.50

6.
Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds

If the TFTP service is enabled and patching is not available immediately, a valid workaround is to filter
TFTP for untrusted hosts in the network (such as the Internet). This is the default configuration when
enabling TFTP on most home routers.

Patches are already available from the software author. Most distributions should release updates for
binary packages soon.

7.
Credits

The heap-overflow vulnerability (CVE-2009-2957) was discovered during Bugweek 2009 by Pablo Jorge and Alberto Soliño
from the team "Los Herederos de Don Pablo" of Core Security Technologies.

The null-pointer dereference (CVE-2009-2958) was reported to the author of dnsmasq independently
by an uncredited code auditor. It was merged with this advisory for user's convenience.

8.
Technical Description

8.1.
Heap Overflow vulnerability (CVE-2009-2957, BID 36121)

First let's focus on the overflow vulnerability.
The tftp_request calls strncat on
daemon->namebuff, which has a predefined size of MAXDNAME bytes (defaulting to 1025).

      else if (filename[0] == '/')
         daemon->namebuff[0] = 0;
      strncat(daemon->namebuff, filename, MAXDNAME);

This may cause a heap overflow because daemon->namebuff
may already contain data, namely the configured daemon->tftp_prefix
passed to the daemon via a configuration file.

    
  if (daemon->tftp_prefix)
	{
	  if (daemon->tftp_prefix[0] == '/')
	    daemon->namebuff[0] = 0;
	  strncat(daemon->namebuff, daemon->tftp_prefix, MAXDNAME)

The default prefix is /var/tftpd, but if a longer prefix is used,
arbitrary code execution may be possible.

Sending the string resulting from the execution of the following python snippet to a vulnerable server, with a long enough directory prefix configured, should crash the daemon.

    
import sys
sys.stdout.write( '\x00\x01' + "A"*1535 + '\x00' + "netascii" + '\x00' )


8.2.
Null-pointer Dereference vulnerability (CVE-2009-2958, BID 36120)

Now onto the null-pointer dereference.
The user can crash the service by handcrafting a packet, because of a problem on the guard of the first if inside this code loop:

    
while ((opt = next(&p, end)))
 {
   if (strcasecmp(opt, "blksize") == 0 &&
       (opt = next(&p, end)) &&
       !(daemon->options & OPT_TFTP_NOBLOCK))
     {
       transfer->blocksize = atoi(opt);
       if (transfer->blocksize < 1)
         transfer->blocksize = 1;
       if (transfer->blocksize > (unsigned)daemon->packet_buff_sz - 4)
          transfer->blocksize = (unsigned)daemon->packet_buff_sz - 4;
       transfer->opt_blocksize = 1;
       transfer->block = 0;
     }

  if (strcasecmp(opt, "tsize") == 0 && next(&p, end) &&
      !transfer->netascii)
     {
       transfer->opt_transize = 1;
       transfer->block = 0;
     }
         } 

The problem exists because the guard of the first if includes the result of opt = next(&p, end) as part of the check. If this returns NULL,
the guard will fail and in the next if strcasecmp(opt, "tsize") will derrefence the null-pointer.

9.
Report Timeline

  • 2009-08-20:
    Core Security Technologies notifies Simon Kelley of the vulnerability, including technical details of the vulnerability in an advisory draft.
  • 2009-08-21:

    Simon Kelley acknowledges the vulnerability and confirms to be working on a patch. He also informs that he is aware that most home router distributions have tftp turned off by default, and firewalled, and suggests this should be mentioned on the advisory. Simon also mentions that a NULL-pointer dereference bug has also been discovered on that code, and suggests merging both bugs in the same advisory.
    Monday 31/08 is accepted as a possible release date for this advisory, and help is offered in contacting
    package maintainers of dnsmasq for most operating systems.
  • 2009-08-21:

    Core changes the advisory draft to accommodate Simon's suggestions.
    About the NULL-pointer dereference, Core mentions the terms it thinks appropriate for the bug to be merged into
    this advisory, and details how this would affect the following procedures, such as asking for a CVE/Bugtraq ID.
  • 2009-08-23:

    Simon Kelley contacts Core back, saying that the terms for the null-pointer derrefence bug to be included in
    the advisory are ok. He also mentions that the finder of this bug prefers to remain
    uncredited in this advisory. Details are sent by him about the new bug so that the advisory draft can be
    updated to include it.
  • 2009-08-23:

    Core asks for proper CVE and Bugtraq ID numbers, specifying it believes each vulnerability reported in
    this advisory should be assigned its own.
  • 2009-08-23:

    Vincent Danen, from Red Hat's Security Response Team contacts Core in order to discuss both vulnerabilities
    by a secure communications channel, and offers its help in obtaining proper CVE numbers, specifying they
    also believe a separate number should be assigned to each vulnerability.
  • 2009-08-23:

    Core replies to Vincent Danen by sending its gpg key. Core also mentions separate CVE numbers have already been asked.
  • 2009-08-23:

    Core replies to Simon Kelley, including a new advisory draft with both bugs merged.
  • 2009-08-23:

    Core receives proper CVE and Bugtraq ID numbers for both bugs, and sends them to Red Hat and Simon Kelley.
  • 2009-08-31:

    The advisory CORE-2009-0820 is published.

10.
References


[1] http://www.thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/doc.html

[2] http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/ien/ien133.txt

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trivial_File_Transfer_Protocol

11.
About CoreLabs

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating
the future needs and requirements for information security technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software
tools for public use at:
http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs.

12.
About Core Security Technologies

Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help security-conscious
organizations worldwide develop and maintain a proactive process for
securing their networks. The company's flagship product, CORE IMPACT, is
the most comprehensive product for performing enterprise security
assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network, endpoint and end-user
vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are exposed. It enables
organizations to determine if current security investments are detecting
and preventing attacks. Core Security Technologies augments its leading technology solution
with world-class security consulting services, including penetration
testing and software security auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos
Aires, Argentina, Core Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web
at http://www.coresecurity.com.

13.
Disclaimer

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2009 Core Security Technologies and
(c) 2009 CoreLabs, and may be distributed freely provided
that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit is given.

14.
PGP/GPG Keys

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories
team, which is available for download at
/legacy/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

Locally Exploitable: 
no
Remotely Exploitable: 
no
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